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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

This new issue of the Economic Sociology Newsletter contains material and reflexions for a better understanding of Pierre Bourdieu's contribution to economic sociology.

Bourdieu never supported "overspecialization" inside the social sciences and was very reluctant to define his contribution to the scientific knowledge of economic activities as a particular kind of " economic sociology". But his theoretical and empirical work since the beginning of the 1960s was largely motivated and dynamized by a direct confrontation to economic models and economic explanations. He was one of the scholars who tried to systematically hybridize economics and sociology and did this in a particularly provocative manner.

Bourdieu's close and complex (some would say "ambivalent") relations to neoclassical economics, his use of the notions of "interest" and "illusio", his constructivist and structural definitions of "class", his attempts to discover the structures of the French economic elites ("patronat") and the French field of power can be important sources of inspiration for contemporary economic sociologists. These themes will be presented and discussed by Richard Swedberg, Bernard Convert, Elliot B. Weininger, Johs Hjellbrekke and Olav Korsnes.

As a complement to the previous issue of the Newsletter, which was focused on the sociology of economics, Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas develops a synthetis and a critical discussion of the recent trends in this field.

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Bourdieu's Advocacy of the Concept of Interest and Its Role in Economic Sociology

by

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According to Bourdieu, sociology must draw on four key concepts in order to make a solid analysis. Three of these are well known in the secondary literature on Bourdieu and often discussed: *habitus*, *field* and different types of *capital*. The fourth concept, on the other hand, is rarely discussed and often not even mentioned: *interest*. According to Bourdieu, "*interest* is 'to be there', to participate, to admit that the game is worth playing and that the stakes created in and through the fact are worth pursuing; it is to recognize the game and to recognize its stakes" (Bourdieu 1998:77; cf. Bourdieu 1990, 1992, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:115-17).The opposite of interest (or "*illusio*") is indifference (or "*ataraxia*"). Each field has its own interest, even if its masquerades as disinterestedness. Bourdieu criticizes the economists' version of interest for being ahistorical - "far from being an anthropological invariant, interest is a *historical arbitrary*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:116). The economists are also in his opinion wrong in thinking that "economic interest" is what drives everything; "anthropology and comparative history show that the properly social magic of institutions can constitute just about anything as an interest" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:117).

In the rest of this article I will make an argument that interest ought to be central to economic sociology, and must not be neglected in this type of sociology, as it is today. References to Bourdieu's concept of interest will be made throughout the route, but the perspective is broader since interest analysis goes far back in social thought and exists in many different versions.

The Concept of Interest and Its Role in Economic Sociology

While the dominant approach in current economic sociology emphasizes the importance of social relations for a proper understanding of the economy, I argue that while this is important, interests should be an equally integral part of the analysis. Institutions, for example, can be seen as distinct constellations of interests *and* social relations. An economic sociology that ignores the role of interests, I argue, runs the risk of becoming trivial. The reason for this is that interests, much more so than social relations, is what drives economic action. This is by no means a novel insight, as the work of Weber and others show. It is, however, a position that has been forgotten in much of modern economic sociology.

That this argument for an economic sociology centered around the concept of interest needs to be discussed is clear. I will therefore first quickly summarize the case for an economic sociology which assigns a key role to the concept of interest, and then indicate some issues that need to be addressed. These latter include how to go about an analysis which takes interests seriously. There is also the questions of circularity and reductionism. It is sometimes argued that an analysis which draws on interests runs the risk of being tautological. It tries to explain everything as the result of some interest. Interest analysis, it is also argued, has a tendency to reduce everything in a mechanical way to some interest. Finally, a few words need to be said about the relationship between interest and motivation, its equivalent in psychology.

The idea that the concept of interest should be central can be found in many of the classical social theorists as well as the founding fathers of sociology. Among the former are David Hume, Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville; and among the latter Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel. Also some of the major sociologists of modern times have assigned an important part to the concept of interest in their analyses. This is especially the case with James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu – two figures who usually end up in opposite corners.

Much more could be said about the general history of the concept of interest, but I do not have the ambition to improve on the works of Albert O. Hirschman (1977, 1986), Stephen Holmes (1990), Johan Heilbron (2001) and others. There is one exception to this however: I want to point out that there also exists *a sociological concept of interest*, which was developed around 1900. The basic idea of Weber, Simmel and a few other thinkers is that interests can only be realized within the framework of society, and that the role of social relations always has to be taken into account in an analysis of interests. Bourdieu, for example, clearly comes out of this tradition.

As opposed to some of the writers on the concept of interest I am favorably disposed to this concept and advocate its use. I generally think that it should be regarded as a major concept in the social sciences, and that it is absolutely indispensable to economic sociology. If sociologists use the concept of interest in their analyses today, it should be noticed, they tend to do so in a casual and unreflected manner, which differs from the way that they deal with key concepts. "Throughout the tradition of sociological analysis it [that is, the concept of interest] is often referred to without further specification", as one commentator points out (Demeulenaere 2001:7715). Key concepts, in contrast, are typically discussed and defined in standard works; they are consciously improved upon; and they are taught to students in introductory courses and texts – all of which is currently *not* the case with the concept of interest in sociology, including economic sociology.

I would also argue that a watershed took place in the history of the concept of interest when the economists, towards the end of the 19th century, gave up on the more complex and many facetted type of interest analysis that can be found in the work of such thinkers as

Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. It is from this point onwards that the concept of interest begins to be reduced to, and exclusively equated with, *economic self-interest*. It is also at this point that interests became the beginning, so to speak, as well as the end of the analysis. it is mainly interest which makes people take action. It supplies the force which make people get up at dawn and work hard throughout the day. Combined with the interests of others, it is a force which can move mountains and create new societies.

A corollary of this is that it helps to explain conflict, which takes place when interests clash. This is true for what happens in a person's mind as well as between individuals, groups and societies. But interests do not only clash and energize the actors; they can also block each other, reinforce each other or immobilize an actor by making her back some religion or politics that supports tradition. The concept of interest, in brief, is a flexible tool of analysis.

Taking interests seriously also means shifting the center of the analysis from the surface of things to what has an important impact on social action. Weber's analysis in *The Protestant Ethic* is paradigmatic in this respect, in its attempt to analyze what made people change their behavior in such a fundamental way that a whole new rationalistic mentality was created. This aspect of *The Protestant Ethic* may in the long run prove as important as its wellknown thesis about the importance of ascetic Protestantism for modern life.

Taking interests seriously can also help to give a balanced place to the role of subjectivity and culture in the analysis of economic behavior. These latter must indeed not be ignored – interests are to some extent always subjective as well as shaped by culture – but interests are also "objective" in the sense that they often constitute an uncommonly stable and stubborn part of social reality. The state or public morality may e.g. forbid a certain activity – which will anyway take place.

Utopian thinkers, from this perspective, can be defined as thinkers who disregard interests in their work. Actors without official interests (say, students) are ignored by those in power and are also prone to utopianism in their actions and thoughts. Being a "free-floating intellectual" is by no means as positive as Karl Mannheim believed. Having an established interest may tie you to the order of things and tempt you to "sell out" - but it also makes you a contender and anchors you in reality.

As noted earlier, there exists an attempt by sociologists in Weber's generation as well as today to integrate interests into the sociological type of analysis; and this approach (as opposed to the non-sociological and non-empirical interest theory of mainstream economics) is what is most congenial to economic sociology. One can summarize this approach as one that takes both interests and social relations into account - as long as it is clear that interests are defined and expressed through social social relations. "Far from being an anthropological invariant," as Bourdieu warns, "interest is *a historical arbitrary*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:116). Also the following statement by Bourdieu is relevant in this context (and deserves to be cited a second time): "anthropology and comparative history show that the properly social magic of institutions can constitute just about anything as an interest" (Bourdieu 1998:83).

But even if there exist a number of positive qualities to the concept of interest, it also raises some problems that need to be discussed. One of these is the issue of tautology. One of Albert O. Hirschman's articles is entitled "The Concept of Interest: From Euphemism to Tautology", and it contains the argument that the economists' concept of interest tends to be tautological since it is used to explain everything (Hirschman 1986). Hermann Isay is another scholar who has given voice to this type of criticism, in one of his articles on the jurisprudence of interests:

> In the first place, the notion of 'interest' is too colorless and therefore almost devoid of content. It does not become clearer by being defined as man's 'desire for the goods of life' [by Philip Heck, elsewhere in this volume]. Under this definition, 'interest' comprises everything that affects human beings either as individuals or as a community: not merely material goods but also ethical, religious, moral interests, the interests of justice, of fairness, 'the highest interests of mankind', and the like. Oertmann has justly remarked that in this way the concept of interest is being inflated to such proportion that it becomes useless. (Isay 1948:316)

What Isay argues is that the concept of interest is treated as if it constitutes the philosopher's stone, something which it certainly isn't. If too much weight is put on the notion of interest, it will brake. While interest should not be treated as if it was *the* major concept in sociology (similar to the way that, say, "class" is used in old-fashioned Marxism), it nonetheless deserves to be treated as one of the more important sociological concepts - and surely as a concept that is indispensable to economic sociology.

A related topic is the question if the concept of interest is reductionistic in nature, that is, if it reduces everything to some interest and thereby impoverishes the analysis. This critique has recently been made by Frank Dobbin, who argues that in contemporary Western society people tend to explain practically everything in terms of interest ("*the interest frame*"). This, however, is no reason for social scientists to do the same, according to Dobbin, who adds that when anthropologists observe totemic societies in which local lore has it that frog spirits rule the universe, they do not conclude that frogs are inscribed in plows and circumcision mats because frogs indeed rule this domain. They conclude that the locals have developed a system of meaning that locates authority over social practices in the frog totem. Likewise, when we study modern social practices, we must do what we can to step outside of the frame of reference of the locals [that is, the interest frame]. (Dobbin 2001:78)

Most of Dobbin's argument, it should be noted, is not directed at the concept of interest that I am advocating in this brief article; what he aims his critique at is the concept of self-interest in economics.

As earlier mentioned, motivation is the equivalent concept in psychology to interest in the other social sciences. The parallels between these two concepts comes out well in the following quote:

> Psychologists favor the term *motivation* to describe the wants, needs, and preferences that guide behavior. Without motivation, there would be few conflicts or problems in human life, especially not between people, because no one would care about anything. Then again, without motivation hardly anything would get done. In fact, without motivation, the human race would not even reproduce itself. Motivation is vital for life to continue. (Baumeister forthcoming).

Since there exists a body of research on motivation, why not simply discard an old-fashioned and "literary" term such as interest and replace it with a more modern and scientific one, such as motivation? One reason for *not* doing so is that this would turn the whole analysis into a study in psychology, as opposed to one in sociology. This is a point that both Weber and Parsons have repeatedly made. To this can be added that interests are not exclusively internal; they are at times also located outside of the individual. What makes interest into such a flexible and evocative concept is actually that it often *spans* the individual and the group; the internal and the external; the biological and the social.

A final issue to be discussed is perhaps the most important of all; and it has to do with the way that the notion of interest can be used in concrete analyses. My own stance is that the concept of interest should primarily be seen as a conceptual tool and as part of middle-range sociology. It should definitely *not* be elevated into some kind of general theory. The idea of creating a "sociological interest analysis" makes no more sense than having a conflict sociology. The concept of interest should be one of the key concepts in sociology – as Bourdieu teaches us.

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Bourdieu: Gary Becker's Critic

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Pierre Bourdieu has sometimes found himself compared to Gary Becker, on the pretext that they both assume an actor driven by interested calculation. A.P. Fiske[1], among others, puts Bourdieu and Becker in the same category: that of supporters of the "selfish rationality assumption". There is a misunderstanding here. To understand Bourdieu's relationship to Becker, one must understand the reasons which led him to employ the concept of interest. He evokes these reasons in, among other sources, his book of interviews with Loïc Wacquant2. In this interview, Bourdieu says that he used the idea of interest "to serve a deliberate and provisional reductionism" to break with the dominant ideas about human conduct which were in current use in classical anthropology, ideas based on obedience to norms and rules. In an approach inspired by Max Weber's use of the economic model to explain the behavior of protagonists in the religious field (priests, prophets and sorcerers), Bourdieu used the notion of interest to contribute to the "disenchantment" of certain social spheres (art, culture, religion, etc.) and to bring to them a materialistic way of thinking.

In the early stages of his intellectual trajectory (around 1965-70), Bourdieu, with the help of statistician Alain Darbel, sometimes constructed mathematical models based on the rational calculation hypothesis, models which they immediately put into critical perspective, in epistemological and sociological terms. Such is the case in his little-known work on the family in the 1960's. In an article he co-authored with Darbel on fertility strategies[3], he seems to be quite close to Becker's modeling approach. Several years preceding Becker's articles on the "Quantity and Quality of Children," Bourdieu and Darbel proposed a model of the *marginal cost of a child*, which gave a realistic account of the relationship between fertility and income level. But, unlike Becker, they supported this model with an examination of the conditions for its implementation: the aptitude for rational calculation, the ability to control the future using rational calculation and forecasting, is not uniformly distributed and assumes the existence of a particular set of conditions, including a certain material security. At this time, inspired by his work on Algeria, Bourdieu wondered about the social conditions of possibility of an implementation by individuals of a rational calculation for their decision-making. Bourdieu drew his inspiration for this subject from the results of his studies on the Algerian peasant world and the urban lower-class[4]. An analysis of the temporal aptitudes of Algerian peasants revealed a way of relating to the future which differs from rational "forecasting": "foresight," which apprehends the future not as an explicitly formulated purpose, but rather as being completely part of the perceived present. Analysis of lower-class behavior showed that the absence of a minimum of financial security led to a "total abandonment to the present." When all practical control of the future is impossible, behavior owes everything to the present situation, with no consideration for future consequences.

To summarize, at this stage in his intellectual trajectory, Bourdieu used the rational calculation hypothesis to explain certain behavior, in order to break with the concept of human conduct which was then dominant in the social sciences - a concept he described as "naive"; but he turned interest and rational calculation into a special case of different possible action patterns, a special case whose social conditions of possibility he demonstrated. Bourdieu's attitude towards Gary Becker must be understood in this dynamic of thought. Bourdieu gives Becker credit for explicitly and systematically posing a definition of the actor and principles of action, the logical consequences of which he pushes to their limits by applying them to areas other than those traditionally studied by economists. And he occasionally praises Becker's "modeling imagination"[5] and even explicitly refers to his models6.

Bourdieu's 1974 criticism of human capital[7], a concept which both resembles and rivals that of cultural capital, does not yet have the radicality it will later develop.[8] In it, Bourdieu gives Becker credit for comparing the profit rates provided by educational investment and economic investment. In other words, Becker appears to be outlining a structural approach to reproduction strategies, which Bourdieu will push right to the end by showing how various strategies - educational, marriage, inheritance, etc. - can only be understood in reference to the systems they form. But Bourdieu also reproaches Becker for not taking into account the structure of the *differential profit rates* which different social categories might expect from investments in various markets, particularly economic and school markets, *according to the volume and structure of their heritage*. He also finds fault with him for not resituating school investment within education strategies, which prevents him from seeing the most important education investment, that is, the *domestic* transmission of cultural capital, upon which the school yield from school activity depends; speaking naively of "ability" and scholastic aptitude, Becker does not see that this aptitude itself is also the product of an investment of time and cultural capital. Bourdieu also criticizes him for forgetting social capital, which explains the economic and social rate of return from school diplomas.

As soon as the field theory took shape, Bourdieu widened the perspective and moved from a critical use of the concept of economic interest and rational calculation to a completely *pluralistic* definition of interest, with the idea that there are as many *specific* interests as there are specialized social fields. From then on he used the concept of *illusio* rather than interest. Resituated in this perspective, Becker's approach, which treats interest (in the strictly economic sense) as an anthropological, universal and transhistoric invariant, seems like an unconscious universalization of an historical arbitrariness, "the form of interest which is generated and required by a capitalist economy"[9], and its anthropology as an example of what Bourdieu calls "scholastic fallacy," an error consisting of taking the model built by the scientist to account for actions to be the very principle of those actions. This error may lead to some radical misinterpretations. There is no better example than that of the family model constructed by Becker. Bourdieu shows that the domestic "economy," the exchange of goods and services within the family, is based on a denial of economy. And yet the model Becker proposes, in, for example, "A Theory of Marriage," reduces to economic calculation that which, by definition, denies and defies calculation: if the family is able to function, it is precisely because it does not obey the definition that Becker's economic model assigns to it.

All things considered, Bourdieu and Becker personify two radically different notions of social action and social science. In Bourdieu's eyes, Becker's approach, apart from the fact that it is a product of deductivist epistemology (which proceeds from principles to facts and not from phenomena to the theoretical principles which account for them), is based on an "imaginary anthropology" and also on a notion of action which oscillates between a mechanical or intellectual determinism and a subjective finalism, an alternative which the concept of *habitus* means to surpass. If hypotheses as removed from reality as those on which Becker's models are based match up relatively well with the facts, it is, according to Bourdieu, because the agents, pushed to act by *illusio*, behave in a "reasonable" way, due to the statistical correspondence between positions and dispositions; in other words, their behavior well-adjusted to the objective chances for success, as if this behavior were rational, yet without it being the product of reasoned intention, and even less so, one of rational calculation.

Notes

1. Fiske, Alan Page (1993), *Structure of Social Life : The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations*, New York, The Free Press.
2. Bourdieu, Pierre, with Wacquant Loïc J.D. (1992), *Réponses*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, p. 91 and onward in the French edition.
3. Bourdieu, Pierre and Darbel, Alain (1966), La fin d'un malthusianisme, in Darras, "*Le partage des bénéfices*", Paris, Editions de Minuit, pp 135-154.
4. Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), *Algérie 60. Structures économiques et structures temporelles*, Paris, Editions de Minuit.
5. Bourdieu, Pierre (1979), *La Distinction*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, note 4 p. 111, French edition.
6. For example, on the subject of attitudes regarding time, Bourdieu cites the model proposed by Becker in his "*Theory of Time Allocation*": the time cost increases at the same time as productivity. Conversely, when productivity is low, goods scarcity strong and time scarcity weak, the best thing is to do as Algerian farmers do: spend time extravagantly, waste time, which is the only thing in abundance. (Bourdieu, Pierre (1980), *Le Sens pratique*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, note 8 p. 200, French edition).
7. In "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable", *Revue Française de Sociologie*, XV, 1974, a criticism he takes up again almost word-for-word fifteen years later in "*The State Nobility*", (French edition : Bourdieu, Pierre (1989), *La noblesse d'Etat*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, p. 391-392.)
8. "The concept of 'human capital,' weak and vague and heavily laden with sociologically unacceptable assumptions...". Bourdieu, Pierre (2000) *Les structures sociales de l'économie*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, p 12.
9. *Réponses*, op. cit., p.92.

Class Analysis and Cultural Analysis in Bourdieu

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Despite longstanding predictions and ever-more frequent declarations to the contrary, social class remains a fertile concept in English-language sociology.[1] Nevertheless, it is also a concept that has undergone dramatic transformation over the last few decades. Indeed, perhaps the most notable aspect of the class theories that have attained prominence during this period lies in their forthright embrace of a rational action perspective. Thus, despite their substantial differences, both the "neo-Marxist" theory of class developed by Erik Wright and the "neo-Weberian" approach cultivated by John Goldthorpe are unabashedly rationalist in orientation.[2] And, while the use of techniques founded on the supposition of rationality has undoubtedly been important in efforts to revamp a concept that (especially in the Marxist case) was in genuine need of critical scrutiny, it also remains true that the widespread turn to these techniques has exacted a price. In particular, the theme of culture has largely slipped off the agenda of class analysis, at least insofar as it takes its bearings from either neo-Marxist or neo-Weberian premises: the utilitarian conceptions of action in which these theories are rooted leave little room at the programmatic level for an analysis of patterns of meaning (even if, from time to time, they prove amenable to *ad hoc* references to culture).

When viewed against this backdrop, the work of Pierre Bourdieu constitutes something of an anomaly. On the one hand, Bourdieu's writings - with their twin emphases on class and culture - are widely translated into English, frequently read, and heavily cited. On the other hand, however, most English-language researchers and commentators have made little effort to come to terms with the peculiarities of Bourdieu's conception of social class (and by extension, with the view of culture it entails), preferring instead to reflexively don Weberian- or Marxian-tinted lenses in order to read these writings. The result has been a situation in which the centrality of the connection between class and culture in Bourdieu's work is acknowledged, but its particular meaning remains elusive. Indeed, at risk of simplification, it may be suggested that researchers who take their cue from Bourdieu generally remain content either to appropriate the concept of "habitus" or to examine patterns of "highbrow" cultural consumption (à la *Distinction*); in both cases, however, an aspect of Bourdieu's sociology tends to be fused to a class concept of alien provenance. Conversely, "theorists" who address the class-culture connection in Bourdieu typically recognize little more than a rehash of the ideology critique familiar from earlier decades, or an unstable blend of Marxist vinegar and Weberian oil ("class + status," vigorously shaken). In none of these cases does Bourdieu emerge as a full-blown, coherent alternative to "de-culturalized" conceptions of social class.

To be sure, not all of the sources of this situation lie outside of Bourdieu's writings themselves. Beyond the frequently-raised question of their difficult style, there remains the fact that *Distinction*, in particular, makes rather heavy use of Marxist terminology (e.g. "relations of production," "class fractions," etc.). As I shall attempt to demonstrate below, this vocabulary can obscure Bourdieu's conception of social class, and by extension, his view of the class-culture relation.[3] In developing this conception, Bourdieu drew as needed on the sociological canon; however, of the intellectual resources the canon made available, the least important were, arguably, the Marxist traditions of class theory and ideology critique.

In what follows, I would like to sketch Bourdieu's understanding of social class and of the role of culture in his class analysis.[4] In order to develop these themes within the space of a short essay, I shall present a highly schematic account, one that cannot do justice to the rich empirical content of Bourdieu's writings. Nevertheless, I believe that this account can serve to indicate the ways in which Bourdieu's work provides the basis of an alternative to the de-culturalized approaches to class that are becoming increasingly influential in English-language sociology.

I.

Taking up the question of the relation between social class and lifestyle, Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1984) develops a relatively straightforward sociological argument: location in the class structure is causally related to a subjective system of dispositions (the habitus); this, in turn, engenders a variety of consumption practices which, as "expressions" of the same dispositions, cohere with one another semantically, and thus exhibit the unity of a lifestyle.

Bourdieu's first break from more familiar traditions of class theory derives from the substitution of the notion of "social space" for that of an (objective) class structure. He constructs a model of this space through the statistical analysis of data that include multiple indicators of the economic and cultural capital of individuals clustered into broad occupational categories, as well as of their families of origin.[5] The analysis yields a factorial space constituted by three orthogonal axes (ranked in terms of the variance they "explain"). The first axis represents the total volume of capital (economic and cultural) associated with each position in the occupational division of labor, and is interpreted to differentiate *class locations* from one another. The second axis represents the composition of capital associated with each position (or as Bourdieu puts it, the "ratio" of one type of capital to the other), and is interpreted to differentiate *fractions* within class locations. The third axis represents the class and fraction location of the family of origin, and is interpreted to differentiate trajectories from one another.[6]

In the explanatory scheme that animates *Distinction*, there are two significant aspects of this "social space" that must be recognized. On the one hand, it is intended to serve as a model of the *system of objective relations* between possible combinations of the most sociologically salient assets in the society. In this respect, the model designates "the set of actually usable resources and powers" (Bourdieu 1984, p. 114) typically held by incumbents of the various positions within the occupational division of labor. On the other hand, each location in social space corresponds to a particular "class condition" - that is, to particular "*conditions of existence*" which entail a specific experience of material necessity. In this respect, the notion of social space serves to identify variations in the social environment within which the habitus has been formed.

Much of *Distinction* is therefore devoted to an empirical demonstration that 1) different consumption practices can be intelligibly viewed as the "expression" of an underlying set of subjective dispositions, and thus cohere into lifestyles, and 2) that these dispositions are, in turn, consistent with the particular mix of "resources and powers" associated with the location in social space in which they are rooted. Thus, for example, the artists and professors exhibit a lifestyle unified around the principle of "aristocratic asceticism," prizing only the most intellectually demanding elements of culture while decrying all things material, whereas the employers, with their "taste of luxury," embrace opulence and shun the "arid" provocations of the most avant-garde cultural forms.

II.

However, Bourdieu's study is not content merely to demonstrate that the contours of the "space of lifestyles" are isomorphic with those of social space. Lifestyles are *symbolic*. This means, in the first instance, that they function as emblems of class (and fraction) position - that is, as indicators of the wealth (material and cultural) of those who display them. Nevertheless, this does not exhaust their significance. We can specify two further functions fulfilled by lifestyles, and, for Bourdieu, by the symbolic in general.

What might be called the Durkheimian-Maussian function of the symbolic becomes apparent as soon as we acknowledge that volume of capital, composition of capital, and trajectory-the three dimensions that define social space - are *gradational* in form. A three-dimensional space constituted by gradational axes is, per definition, one that is *devoid of inherent boundaries*. In other words, classes (and fractions) are not demarcated from one another at the level of structure.[7] Once this is recognized, it becomes clear that consumption practices serve as more than mere emblems of location in social space. As a symbolic vehicle, each act of consumption enables individuals to express their affinity or antipathy for one another. In doing so, these individuals introduce symbolic boundaries into the continuous structure of social space, categorizing themselves, vis-à-vis all others, as alike or different. Indeed, the symbolic, for Bourdieu, is a "separative power,... *diacrisis, discretio,* drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuities, difference out of the undifferentiated" (Bourdieu 1984, p. 479). Moreover, the process through which demarcations of the social space are established is, for Bourdieu, inherently antagonistic:

> Every real inquiry into the divisions of the social world has to analyze the interests associated with membership or non-membership. As is shown by the attention devoted to the strategic, "frontier" groups such as the "labor aristocracy", which hesitates between class compromise and class collaboration,... the laying down of boundaries between the classes is inspired by the strategic aim of "counting in" or "being counted in," "cataloguing" or "annexing".... (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 476)

The practices that comprise a lifestyle thus serve as the medium through which individuals undertake an elementary form of *social classification*. Put schematically, individuals vie to impose a categorical symbolic frame onto the continuous structure of social space. The result of successful imposition is a recognized set of *social collectivities* - or in other words, social classes (and "social fractions").[8] In the course of this process of classification, social space-which Bourdieu also refers to as the "field of classes" - stands as a background constraint on alternative classificatory strategies: the likelihood of the successful imposition of any particular symbolic frame is conditioned by the *relative proximity*, within this space, of the individuals who are to be incorporated into the same collectivity (Bourdieu 1990, p. 138).[9]

In addition to enabling classification, the symbolic fulfills a function that can be termed Weberian. Specifically, it serves as the medium through which individuals and collectivities proffer claims for *social honor*. It is around this dimension of the symbolic that whole discussion of "cultural legitimacy" revolves in *Distinction*. The allocation of social honor proceeds on the basis of individuals' capacity to claim legitimacy for their lifestyles and for the particular practices that compose them. Drawing on their cultural and material resources, and propelled by their habitus, they seek to appropriate the legitimate culture in the legitimate manner - or seek to contest the grounds on which legitimacy is accorded. The consequence of competitions and conflicts over the legitimate culture is a hierarchy, of greater or lesser stability, of social worth and prestige.[10]

Together, classification and the allocation of honor yield social classes and class fractions in their "primitive" state - that is, in the "misrecognizable" form of status groups. In this way, it may be argued, Bourdieu knits class to culture more tightly than any of the alternative approaches currently on the sociological scene, but without sliding off into the semiological free-for-all of "postmodern" social theory.

III.

Insofar as the symbolic boundaries that constitute collectivities are engendered through lifestyle differences, they are necessarily indistinct, fuzzy, and porous; moreover, such boundaries can only be sustained by continuous re-generation in the ongoing flux of consumption practices. However, as soon as we look beyond *Distinction*, it becomes clear that, for Bourdieu, lifestyle amounts only to one of the modalities in which the symbolic operates. (Indeed, it is the project of analyzing these different modalities that integrates *Distinction* with the rest of Bourdieu's corpus.) The demarcation lines between social groups become progressively more sharp and durable to the extent that the symbolic frameworks through which actors perceive and appreciate social differences are *codified*. As Bourdieu declares, "To codify means to banish the effect of vagueness and indeterminacy, boundaries which are badly drawn and divisions which are only approximate, by producing clear classes and making clear cuts, establishing firm frontiers... " (1990, p. 82). In the available space, the different modalities of symbolic classification can only be briefly touched upon.

Oriented to wine and clothing, art and leisure, consumption practices do not, as a rule, have group boundaries as their theme. Thus, these boundaries attain a provisional codification as soon as they are articulated discursively - or in other words, once the collectivity is *named*. Once classes receive linguistic designations, criteria of inclusion can be articulated, and their limits can become a theme of interest (in both senses of the term). Moreover, only with the discursive identification of the group can an individual come to recognize his or her membership in a collectivity. This means that the name stands as the precondition of any collective *mobilization* (1991, pp. 206-207). The discursive classification of the social order often merely articulates differences that are already given through lifestyles.

Additionally, issues of status and prestige also arise here. For according to Bourdieu, considerations of status impact individuals' inclination to enter into competitions to describe the social world, insofar as these are situated in forums dominated by norms of the "legitimate" use of language (see 1991, pp. 90-102). Thus, the proclivity to speak on behalf of the collective - to describe its situation, to articulate its needs and demands, etc. - is at least partially conditioned by a sense of "worthiness" that has its roots in the status order.

Hence, in Bourdieu's assessment, members of the working class tend to be prone to self-censorship, refraining from the kind of public speech that could serve to codify the identity of the class. Consequently, they find themselves compelled to *delegate* this work to professional "spokespersons": "The 'working class' exists in and through the body of representatives who give it an audible voice and a visible presence, and in and through the belief in its existence which this body of plenipotentiaries succeeds in imposing... " (Bourdieu 1991, p. 251).[11]

Symbolic divisions of the social space achieve a greater codification when they are inscribed into objectivity via *institutionalization*. Educational credentials are Bourdieu's preferred example. Various social categories - for example, "skilled manual laborer" or "professional" - exist largely by virtue of the educational system's capacity to confer degrees that serve as a de facto or de jure condition of entry into specific occupations. Bourdieu's later educational sociology - and in particular, *The State Nobility* (1996) - increasingly focused on this function of credentials, emphasizing their powers to *separate* holders from non-holders and simultaneously *elevate* the former over the latter in the status order.

The symbolic boundaries differentiating classes and fractions from one another attain their greatest objectivity when written into *law*. Here, the process of tracing of boundaries is subject to an extreme level of formalization, resulting in highly precise demarcation of collectivities. Such boundaries are further distinguished by the fact that they are actively enforced by a branch of state.

With this, it becomes clear that Bourdieu's focus on the classificatory power of symbolic expression logically culminates in a sociology of *the state*. Playing off of Weber's famous statement, Bourdieu defines the state as "that X... which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence over a definite territory" (Bourdieu 1998, p. 40). With this definition, he wishes to foreground the universally recognized and exclusive right of the state to determine or at least adjudicate all social boundaries that enjoy an *obligatory validity*. This right touches on things like educational credentials, which the state oversees from a distance (variable, of course, according to time and place), but also the endless administrative taxonomies that the various bureaus and agencies of state construct in order to directly regulate various domains of social life.

The exercise of this aspect of state authority has divergent consequences on classificatory conflicts that transpire at lower levels of codification (that is, in discourse or through lifestyles). On the one hand, the obligatory character of state-sanctioned classifications can restrict the range options open to actors who clash with one another over the meaning and perception of the social world. On the other hand, however, access to and influence over the state authority itself becomes an object of such conflicts. Occupational classifications stand out as one of the examples most pertinent to the question of class. Produced by administrative agencies with regulatory authority, these "state forms of classification" (Bourdieu 1998, p. 54) are imposed on economic actors, affecting all aspects of economic behavior (hiring, recompense, task definition, etc.). As such, their origin can be traced back to the bureaucratic field in which they were formulated, whose agents enjoy a monopoly over the production of "official" descriptions of the economy (Bourdieu 1998, pp. 58-60). Nevertheless, the impetus for many occupational classifications lies in the economic domain itself, where actors frequently petition the state to *ratify* the outcomes of conflicts over the relation between titles and jobs (Bourdieu 1996, pp. 122-123).

IV.

Bourdieu's sociology demands that we take seriously the link between social class and symbolic classification. Once this is established, the unity that underlies much of Bourdieu's work becomes readily apparent. As Wacquant has suggested, "Bourdieu's entire oeuvre may be read as a quest to explicate the specificity and potency of symbolic power" (1993, pp. 1-2). By tracking the symbolic through its various modalities - from seemingly incidental endeavors such as enjoying a book or a CD to the equally mundane act of using a collective noun, from humanistic or technocratic credentialing systems to the magisterial pronouncements of law - Bourdieu's research seeks to reveal the inner workings a form of power which is ignored by class theories that have over-committed themselves to materialism and/or rationalism.[12]

By refusing to recognize boundaries between classes and fractions at the level of social structure, Bourdieu attempted to de-naturalize them, and thereby historicize them more radically than alternative approaches: collectivities, his work implies, must be approached by sociologists as "historical artifacts" (Bourdieu 1987, pp. 8-9). At an analytic level, the most immediate consequence of this decision is to refocus attention on the "agentic" dimension of class-that is, on the role of lifestyles, language-use, state policy and the like in "constructing" social collectivities. However, it is necessary to recall that Bourdieu did not foreswear the concept of a class structure that exercises "causal powers."[13] It is precisely his fusion of structural analysis and phenomenological analysis that has no clear analogue in English-language studies of social class.

Of course, if Bourdieu's re-conceptualization of social class offers a potential alternative to the unpalatable choice between rational action models, on the one hand, and hyper-cultural "postmodernism," on the other, this alternative is by no means "ready-made." As a result of his rigid insistence on the integration of theory with empirical analysis, Bourdieu's work is in many ways bound up with the particularities of the context in which his research was carried out, and thus cannot be mechanically transposed elsewhere.[14] Nevertheless, it may be hoped that as the English-language reception of Bourdieu's work progresses, the emphasis will move beyond the current vogues for meta-theoretical pronouncement and incidental borrowing, to instead reflectively engage with the careful reconstruction of fundamental sociological concepts that can be found there.

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1. In the U.S., Robert Nisbet pronounced the eclipse of social class as an analytically worthwhile concept in 1959. Many of the English-language quarrels of the last 15 years over the viability of the class concept remain within the orbit of the debates triggered by Nisbet. For recent arguments against continued use of the concept of class, see Pakulski and Waters (1996) and Kingston (2000); see also the debates reproduced in Lee and Turner (1996).

2. For an application and overview of the neo-Marxist perspective see Wright (1997; forthcoming); for Wright's views on and defense of the use of rational action theory, see Wright (1994, pp. 189-191). The underpinnings of Goldthorpe's approach to social class are elaborated upon in (2000, pp. 206-229); see also Breen (forthcoming). His arguments for the primacy of rationalistic action theory are found in Goldthorpe (2000, pp. 115-136).

3. To fully understand the peculiar role of Marxian vocabulary in Bourdieu's writings it would be necessary to analyze the French sociological field of the 1960s and 1970s - including, in particular, the various strains of Marxist and non-Marxist class analysis being practiced at the time - in order to thereby illuminate his attempts to carve out an alternative (and oppositional) position.
In a different vein, it should be noted that, despite certain high profile (and highly polemical) exceptions, the magnitude of Bourdieu's divergence from Marxism on the question of class and culture is better-recognized in France than in English-speaking countries - for example, in Accardo (1997) and Pinto (2000).

4. I draw on Weininger (2002, forthcoming).

5. Bourdieu utilizes Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), a relatively unfamiliar technique in English-language sociology that is similar in some ways to factor analysis. For a discussion of Bourdieu's preference for MCA, see Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000).

6. The degree to which the resulting model departs from traditional conceptions of class, and especially the "classical" Marxist ones, is rarely remarked upon. Nevertheless, it is dramatic. To take just the most obvious example, Bourdieu's construction results in a "dominant" class whose antithetical fractions are comprised by artists and intellectuals, on the one hand, and industrial and commercial employers, on the other. Is it necessary to belabor the fact that these fractions do not represent different "moments" in the process of commodity production?

7. This implies that the chapters of *Distinction* which analyze classes individually (by and large, in order to examine internecine conflicts between fractions) rest on a thoroughly arbitrary demarcation. Bourdieu acknowledges this, at least with respect to the differentiation of fractions from one another (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 258-259).

8. It is his interest in this Durkheimian-Maussian dimension of the symbolic which leads Bourdieu to declare, a propos of social classes, that "the question with which all sociology ought to begin" is "that of the existence... and mode of existence of collectives" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 250).

9. Within the Marxist tradition, the argument developed by Adam Przeworski in a 1977 essay on class formation comes closest to this aspect of Bourdieu's approach: "classifications of positions must be viewed as immanent to the practices that (may) result in class formation. The very theory of classes must be viewed as internal to particular political projects" (Przeworski 1985, p. 67). However, Przeworski's argument, though much debated, never gave rise to a sustained program of empirical research.

10. It is in this context that Bourdieu's depiction of working class has generated vehement criticism: by his own account, the members of this class tend to quiescently exclude themselves from competitions over legitimate culture, thus serving as little more than a "foil" against which members of the other classes may symbolically assert their distinction, and hence their elevated status. However, in the discussions of practices such as food consumption and language use in *Distinction*, one can also identify an alternative account. In these arenas, the working class is presented as culturally self-assertive, implicitly and explicitly "[challenging] the legitimate art of living" (see Bourdieu 1984, pp. 179, 395). The factor triggering one of these stances or the other would appear to be the manner in which cultural "consecration" is organized: in areas of culture in which the formation of canons (e.g. the arts) or the establishment of "trends" (e.g. clothing) is more or less effectively monopolized by a small group of "experts" and producers, the working class - bereft of the cultural capital needed to access the relevant institutions and interpersonal networks - opts for self-exclusion; however, in the areas where the conferral of legitimacy is more diffuse, contestation is perceived as plausible. Bourdieu undoubtedly considers the former to be the norm and the latter an exception, as evidenced by his remarks on cultural "dispossession" and "alienation" (1984, pp. 386ff.).

11. It is only once we realize that discourse amounts to a (partially) codified exercise of the same capacity to draw boundaries and allocate honor that inheres in lifestyle practices that it becomes clear why Bourdieu's *Distinction* - a text which, after all, is devoted to analyzing the social conditions of *aesthetic* judgment - should conclude with a chapter examining the circulation of *normative-political* judgments in the public sphere (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 397-465). The place of this chapter in the work has received little attention from English-language commentators despite the apparent incongruity of its subject matter.

12. It must be pointed out that Bourdieu pursued this interest well beyond the question of social class, even if the latter tended to enjoy a certain prominence in most of his work. I have discussed at length Bourdieu's view of the relation between class and factors such as gender in Weininger (2002; forthcoming).

13. Wacquant summarizes Bourdieu's twin emphases well when he declares that "[c]lass lies neither in structures nor in agency alone but in their relationship as it is historically produced, reproduced, and transformed" (1991, p. 51).

14. For an effort at an informed transposition of certain aspects of Bourdieu's educational sociology to the U.S. context, see Weininger and Lareau (forthcoming). It must be admitted, however, that this essay makes use of a traditional concept of social class.

"Le patronat norvégien": State vs. Market?

Capital Structures, Oppositions and Political Position Taking in the Norwegian Field of Power.

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1. Introduction

Concepts like power, class and elite are most often founded on an assumption that society, the positions an individual occupies herein and also the relations between individuals located in these positions, can be analysed as a multidimensional hierarchy. And while it is common to separate between different forms of power (as for instance military, bureaucratic, economic or symbolic power), it is also common to separate between different types of elites, for instance political, administrative and economic elites (Scott (ed.)1990, Suleiman & Mendras (eds.) 1997).

The criteria for the latter differentiation have usually been related to societal sectors, specific societal tasks, levels of power or to functional criteria. As early as in 1950, Raymond Aron argued in favour of a division based on the function of ruling, and identified 5 subgroups of the elite: political leaders, government administrators, economic leaders, leaders of the masses and military chiefs (Aron 1950a : 9). Aron went on to emphasize that an analysis of elites also had to be relational and comparative in orientation: "By the structure of the élite I mean the relation between various groups in the élite which is peculiar to each society. Indeed, although there are everywhere business managers, government officials, trade union secretaries and ministers, they are not everywhere recruited in the same way and they may either form one coherent whole or remain comparatively distinct from one another." (ibid. p.10)

While not sharing Aron's functional approach, we agree with his relational strategy and his call for comparative analysis. Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu and Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin's work (in particular Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin 1978, Bourdieu 1989), we will in this short article suggest how a relational strategy in studies of classes and elites may be developed through a brief analysis of attitudes of "le patronat norvégien" towards the role of the State vs. the Market when it comes to what should be the central principles of political and societal organisation.

Struggles between elite groups are also struggles over what principles should be the central with respect to the distribution, differentiation and accumulation of the various types of power or capital in the field of power, a concept first coined by Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). This struggle is at the same time a struggle over what should be the dominating logic in the field of power (for instance to what degree the dominant neoliberal economic logic in the economic field shall prevail over the logic in the political field) and over the value of different types of capital (e.g. economic, political, cultural and social capital).

Internationally, a commonly raised issue about Bourdieu's empirical analysis (both in connection with Bourdieu 1979 and Bourdieu 1989) has been to question whether the results of the analysis would remain valid outside the French society. In our opinion, the debate over this issue has been flawed by the failure of some critiques (for instance Alexander 1995) to separate clearly between empirical and theoretical generalizations (see Champagne 1990, Bourdieu 1992). In our view, it is fairly obvious that the outcome of empirical analysis of power structures in e.g. Norway cannot be predicted from analysis of French data, but this does not mean that the theoretical understanding and interpretation of the French data is not relevant to the understanding and interpretation of the outcome of empirical analysis in a different social setting. Furthermore, recent empirical studies (Rosenlund 1998, 2000, Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2003) also reveal structural similarities between the French and Norwegian social spaces. This will be further discussed below.

In contrast to Aron, the elite subgroups in our analysis will not be defined a priori, but will instead be identified through an analysis of what we tentatively may call "the Norwegian field of power". Based on survey data from the Norwegian Power and Democracy Survey on Norwegian elites (Gulbrandsen & al. 2002, Holt & Prangerød 2001), and using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) (see Rouanet & Le Roux 1993) as our main statistical tool, two main questions will be addressed:

1. What are the dominant capital structure oppositions in what we tentatively may call "the Norwegian field of power"?

2. What are the relations between the structures in the Norwegian field of power and the structures in the habitus of the agents that are located in the positions in this field? In other words; are structural oppositions and relations between positions in the field of power also present in position specific variations in perceptions, attitudes and dispositions?

Whereas the first analysis will be based on a MCA of a set of capital indicating variables, the latter analysis will be based on a MCA of the respondents' responses to 20 statements about what should be dominant political goals and principles, societal views, ethical guidelines, control and ownership of Norwegian businesses and enterprises.

Before presenting the results, we will strongly emphasize that an exhaustive analysis of the capital structures in the Norwegian field of power demands far more than the analyses and the discussions presented in this article. Furthermore, advanced statistical techniques cannot replace a detailed historical-sociological analysis of the issues we are addressing. Finally, as Henry Rouanet, Brigitte Le Roux and Werner Ackermann (2000) have pointed out: "In the analysis of questionnaires, doing correspondence analysis is not enough to do "analyses à la Bourdieu".

2. Key concepts. Social space', 'fields', 'habitus' and 'field of power'.

As is well known, Bourdieu s theory of the social space "presupposes a series of breaks with

Marxist theory" (Bourdieu 1991: 229). "Classes" are located theoretically as positions within a multidimensional social space of relations. The dimensions in this space are constructed on the basis of various types of capital that also are active as principles of social differentiation. The relative positions and the systems of oppositions within the social space are thus seen as products of the distribution of different types of capital (economical, cultural, social etc.) and social power relations in the society that is analysed. These relationally defined "classes" are not to be understood as *actual* classes (or mobilized groups), but rather *probable* classes (groups that may be socially and politically mobilized).

At the same time, the various types of capital are also structuring mechanisms in the various *fields of action*. These are the arenas in which the agents invest their capital as means in a struggle for realizing field specific goals, e.g. the achievement of powerful positions in the political or the scientific field. A given agent's power in a field can be seen as dependent on the volume of capital the agent can "invest" in the "field-play", the structure of the agent's capital, and the agent's *habitus*.

The *field of power* is the arena where agents located in dominant positions in various fields are engaged in struggles that affect the continuation or change of the power relations within the different fields, but also, and not at least, struggles over the relations between the different fields (see Bourdieu & de Saint Martin 1978, Bourdieu 1989, Bourdieu 1991).

Not surprisingly, in Bourdieu's analyses (for instance Bourdieu 1989:379-80), the field of power has been located in the most "capital loaded" sectors of the social space. The same goes for the positions we are focusing on below (see Hjellbrekke 2000, Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2003 for details).

3. Data

The analyses are based on data from a survey of 1711 persons in leading positions in the Norwegian society during the autumn of 2000, performed by the Norwegian Power and Democracy Survey. The sample is as follows:

a) Research and higher educational institutions - 146 persons

b) Defence/military - 68 persons

c) Central administration - 197 persons

d) Church - 107 persons

e) Culture organisations/institutions - 143 persons

f) Media - 116 persons

g) Private and public businesses - 308 persons

h) Organisations - 215 persons

i) The political system - 190 persons

j) Police and judicial system - 138 persons

A first examination of the univariate distributions reveals a clearly gendered sample. The position holders are also well educated, their income levels are well above the average for the population, and their social background is (not surprisingly) also clearly skewed:

1. 85% are men and 15% women

2. 62% have a higher university degree or an education at phd-level. Only 2.6% finished their education after compulsory education

3. 50% have an income > NOK 1 mill.

4. 25% have a fortune > NOK 1 mill.

5. 8% have a capital income > NOK 200 000

6. 30% have a father and 11% a mother with a university degree.

7. 40% have a father who holds/held a position as a leader at higher or intermediate levels, whereas 33% of the mothers work/worked in what John H. Goldthorpe (Erikson & Goldthorpe1991) has coined "non-manual routine jobs".

4. Capital Structures and Oppositions in the Field of Power.

17 variables have been selected as active capital indicators and as indicators of the respondents 'social positions, giving a total of 95 active categories in the MCA:

Income - 8 categories

Capital income – 7 categories

Own education – 6 categories

Father's education – 6 categories

Mother's education – 6 categories

Father's occupation – 7 categories

Mother's occupation – 7 categories

Yrs of experience in central administration – 5 categories

Yrs of experience in research – 5 categories

Yrs of experience in politics – 5 categories

Yrs of experience in

organisations – 5 categories

Yrs of experience in

police/judicial system – 4 categories

Yrs of experience in business – 6 categories

Yrs of experience in defence – 4 categories

Yrs of experience in church – 4 categories

Yrs of experience in media – 5 categories

Yrs of experience in culture – 5 categories

As this list indicates, we mix two types of information in the analysis, and this is not a strategy without problems: both intra- and intergenerational mobility trajectories are inscribed in the solution. The reason why we still think that this can be justified, is that this solution unites two of the central conditions that are active with respect to the formation of structures in the agents' habituses: professional or occupational conditions and social background conditions. The variable on field positions is given status as a supplementary variable, and will be "projected" into the solution.

The MCA gives us two main axes to interpret.

Axis 1: ? 1 = 0.16105 34.4 % of the inertia

Axis 2: ? 2= 0.14089 22.2 % of the inertia

If we follow the interpretative strategy outlined by Le Roux and Rouanet (1998), the examination of the absolute contributions reveals two clear oppositions along these two axes. The first axis separates between high and low volumes of inherited cultural capital:

Table 1: Absolute contributions from variables to axes 1 and 2. Contributions from oppositions between categories to variable (intra-contribution). Threshold value for variables = 5.9%, for categories 1.1%.

Variable	**Contribution to axis 1** **Intra-contribution to variable**	**Contribution to axis 2** **Intra-contribution to variable**
Own income (NOK)		17.6% to axis 2. 340’-399’ vs. 750’-999’/1 mill+ : 64.5%
Capital income (NOK)		9.5% to axis 2 <10’ vs. 200’-999’/1 mill+: 74.7%
Own education		13.3% to axis 2. Continuing Ed.2/Univ2 vs. Phd. : 81.%
Father's education		6.4% to axis 2

	21% to axis 1. Basic education vs. Univ2/Univ3: 94.5%	Continuing Ed.1 vs. Univ.3 : 72.7%.
Mother's education	18.7% to axis 1 Basic education vs. Continuing Ed.2/Univ.1-3: 98.4%	
Father's occupation	21.1% to axis 1. Leading position vs Skilled/Unskilled manual/Farmer: 93.9%	
Mother's occupation	13.7% to axis 1. Leading/Intermediate vs. Unskilled manual/Farmer: 92.3%	
Yrs of experience in research		8.9% to axis 2. 5-9 yrs/10-19 yrs/20 yrs+ vs. None: 94.5%
Yrs of experience in business		24.3% to axis 2. 20-29yrs/30yrs+ vs. None: 95.4%
Sum, contributions of variables	**74.5%**	**80%**

Four variables, Father's and Mother's educations and Father's and Mother's occupations account for 74% of the inertia explained by the dimension. The intra-contributions are systematically generated by the opposition between Basic education vs. Continuing ed. 2 and/or university studies, and by the opposition between leading non-manual positions and manual positions/farmers.

The second axis can be interpreted as a capital structure axis, separating between the highest levels of economic and educational (i.e. institutionalised cultural) capital. There is also a clear opposition between leaders of larger businesses and leaders of academic institutions. However, the patterns of the intra-contributions are not as uniform as those found for axis 1. While the intra-contributions generated by the oppositions between the higher and lower values on the economic capital, the central oppositions is found between the intermediate continuing educations/lower university degrees and educations at Phd-level or equivalent.

In the diagram below, the mean points of the various positions are "projected" into the solution found for the cloud of the individuals:



Fig. 1: Positions in the Norwegian Field of Power.

As can clearly be seen from the figure, the structure of the Norwegian field of power is tri-polar. We find one cluster of positions that all are related to private businesses, one cluster in and around the political system and one cluster of positions that belong to public sector.

A detailed examination of the cloud of individuals (see Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2003) also confirms the interpretation of the first axis. While respondents having parents in leading positions, i.e. being of upper white collar background, are located in the left quadrants of the figure, respondents whose parents worked in manual occupations or who where farmers are located at the right hand side of the figure. It also turns out that the first axis, if not perfectly, separates between persons with the highest and the lowest levels of own education.

Axis two turns out not only to be a capital structure axis, but also to describe a related opposition between positions in private vs. public sector, expressed most clearly by the opposition between owners/CEOs of private companies (upper left quadrant) and leaders of institutions of higher education/research (lower quadrants). In the two right quadrants, we find the mean points for the various political positions, included the leaders of the unions and also the political journalists. The area where the accumulation and reproduction of cultural capital is at its strongest (lower left quadrant), is where we find the leaders of cultural institutions, leaders of independent research institutes, and higher civil servants like supreme court judges. High volumes of accumulated cultural capital thus give access to positions in institutions that are important distributors of the same capital.

The mean points for the political positions, to the contrary, are located in the field areas where the accumulation and volumes of educational and inherited cultural capital are at their lowest: persons whose parents left school after compulsory education, most often working in manual occupations, are found in the two right quadrants. The political positions are thus the most "open" with respect to social mobility, whereas the positions in the lower left quadrant are the most "closed". So far, there are therefore clear indications that the cultural and political/organisational field areas are in diagonal opposition to each other in the Norwegian field of power.

Finally, the field is strongly gendered. Women are in reality excluded from the upper left quadrant where the positions of the business leaders are located. Thus, the internal opposition between cultural and political capital is seemingly more dominating for women than for men.

To sum up the results of the analysis so far, the Norwegian field of power anno 2002 seems to be organized around an opposition between cultural and political/organisational capital, and between cultural and economic capital. The question that now arises is whether similar oppositions are present in the agents' position *taking*.

5. State vs. Market? Political Position Taking in the Norwegian Field of Power.

Among leading Norwegian economic historians, one of the dominant views of the country's economic history is that it constitutes a "Sonderweg" when compared to the rest of Western Europe. The capitalist history of Norway is not impregnated by a strong internal financial bourgeoisie and/or bourgeoisie families, as for instance the Wallenberg family in Sweden. Furthermore, Norwegian banks and financial institutions were not long-term investors in industrial companies and did not act as industrial and economic strategists, as under the so-called Rhein-model. As the economic historian Francis Sejersted (1993) points out, the role of the State was not only regulatory, but also compensatory; to act as an investor, owner and strategist. State ownership of banks, industrial companies and oil companies has increased during the post-war period and despite the neo-liberal turn in the 1990s, it is at present probably higher than ever, and the centralised tripartite system of income regulation has not been dismantled, but rather invigorated (Dølvik and Stokke 1998). In general, one would therefore expect rather strong pro-state sympathies among all actors in the Norwegian field of power. However, at least since the mid-1980s a growing emphasis on deregulating markets (housing, finance, mass media, post, telecommunications, energy etc.) and adjusting to a more fierce global economic competition (e.g. in the oil industry) is so conspicuous that it would be surprising if it was not also reflected in the position-taking in some areas (in particular the business area) and among some actors (in particular economic actors) in the field of power.

Also, and perhaps as a consequence of the lack of both a landed gentry and a strong financial bourgeoisie, the state and struggles over state intervention and power has been of particular importance in the political and cultural fields, as these fields both bears traits of a historical tension between a state-upholding elite of well-educated senior civil servants (during vital phases in the building of the nation-state), a well-organised labour movement and a variety of popular "countercultures".

Analyses of Norwegian political history, and of struggles over the State have thus strongly emphasised the persisting role of the so-called "countercultures" (Rokkan 1987) and their opposition to urban, conservative elites. Historically, the "countercultures" can be described as an unstable alliance between members of religious groups, the temperance movement, teachers, workers, farmers and fishermen in the rural districts, and urban liberals and intellectuals. Combining nationalist views with a progressive political agenda, e.g. a persistent struggle for expanded democratic rights, and an emphasis upon the active role of the State as a welfare provider, this "counterculture" constellation provided strong support for the new state-upholding social-democratic regime, which consolidated its position in the first post-war period. And although both this regime and the "counterculture" constellation have crumbled, there is reason to expect that this historical heritage still leaves an imprint on the structure of oppositions in the Norwegian field of power, and on position-taking on state vs. market issues. As we have already observed there is e.g. a diagonal opposition between a rather "closed" cultural zone and a much more "open" political one, which is partly an opposition along an economic capital dimension, and which suggests that a more pro-market position-taking can be expected in the latter zone.

An analysis of the responses to 20 statements (see appendix), all coded from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree" with a total of 80 active categories once again gives us two axes to interpret, summarizing a total of 81% of the inertia:

Axis 1: ? 1 = 0.23078 55 % of the inertia

Axis 2: ? 2 = 0.17385 26 % of the inertia

Table 2 provides a synopsis of the contributions from the most central variables with respect to the construction of the axes, and of the intra-contributions from the oppositions between the various categories:

Table 2: Absolute contributions from variables to axes 1 and 2. Intracontributions from oppositions between categories. Threshold value = 5% for variables and 1.3% for individual categories.

Variable/Statement	**Contribution of variable to axis 1** **Intracontribution to variable**	**Contribution of variable to axis 2** **Intracontribution to variable**
Important businesses and financial institutions in Norway should be owned by Norwegians.	5.2% to axis. Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 73%	
The political control over a number of partly privatised state companies, e.g. Telenor ("Telecom Norway"), Norwegian State Railways and the Postal Service, is too weak and should be strengthened	5.4% to axis Partly agree vs. Totally disagree: 72.7%	
Norwegian investments abroad should follow Norwegian environmental standards for work regulation and environmental protection whenever they are stricter than the local laws.	7.0% to axis Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 89.2%	5.7% to axis Totally agree vs. Partly disagree: 73.3%
In Norway, we've come far enough in reducing economic inequalities.	10.2% to axis Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 83.1%	7.3% to axis Totally agree vs. Partly disagree: 79.3%
Cultural enterprises, e.g. media and publishers, should mainly be owned by Norwegians.		5.0% to axis

	6.1% to axis Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 82.5%	Totally agree vs. Partly disagree: 71.5%
In Norway, the distance between the elites and the population is too large when it comes to real political influence		5.2% to axis Totally agree vs. Partly disagree:79.3%
It is more important to further the level of public services than to reduce taxes.	11.6% to axis Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 89.2%	7.1% to axis Totally agree vs. Partly agree/disagree: 75.6%
In Norway, one should favour more privatisation and a smaller public sector.	13.8% to axis Totally agree vs Partly/Totally disagree: 96.7%	7.4% to axis Partly agree vs. Totally disagree: 79.8%
State control over private enterprise should be reduced.	10.9% to axis Totally agree vs Partly/Totally disagree: 96.9%	7.8% to axis Partly agree vs. Totally disagree: 87.8%
We should construct gas power plants in Norway, based on the existing technology.	5.9% to axis Totally agree vs Totally disagree: 95.8%	
We should favour a society where Christian values play a more important role than they do today.		5.4% to axis Partly disagree vs. Totally disagree: 85.8%
Immigration levels should be adjusted to labour market demands.		6.4% to axis Partly disagree vs. Totally agree/disagree:79%
Sum, Contribution of variables	**76.6%**	**57.3%**

A closer examination of the structure of the absolute contributions yields support to an interpretation of axis 1 as a "classic" political left-right dimension. Categories indicating a general "rightist", liberal/neoliberal political orientation (in favour of market/private solutions, opposition to state control, economic issues given predominance over environmental issues) are all localised at the right hand side of the axis (positive coordinates), whereas categories indicating a general "leftist" political orientation are at the left hand side of the axis (negative coordinates).

At first, axis 2 may seem less clear. Not only are the statements that contribute the most to its construction more heterogeneous than what we find for axis 1. There are also oppositions between categories that indicate strong rightist/leftist political views (strongly agree(disagree) and the more moderate categories (partly agree/disagree). But this pattern is consistent. Whereas the "extreme" response categories are given negative categories on the axis, the "mid"-categories are given positive coordinates. While axis 1 separates àween this elite (and part of the political elite) and an academic/cultural elite defending a strong state involvement in the economy, low income differentials and participatory political principles.

Between these two clusters, we find "neutral" positions that either are related to institutions that have an obligation under the Constitution to remain politically neutral (Police/Attorneys, Judges, Departments, Other higher public offices, Armed forces) and business enterprises that depend upon a "balancing act" between the Market and State regulations (Co-operatives, State controlled businesses, Private cultural institutions, Media companies), or positions where it is important to avoid any suspicion of making decisions on the basis of political sympathies and ties (Research council, Research Institute, Mass media). These are mainly also given positive coordinates on the second axis.

It is also a gendered space: the clear majority of women are located in the two left quandrants, whereas men (yet again) are evenly distributed in all the four quadrants. With respect to social background, respondents whose fathers were manual workers (an indicator of low volumes of inherited cultural capital) are found on the right side of the axis. Finally, there is an opposition between respondents having a higher degree in humanities or pedagogy and degrees in engineering/sciences (i.e. a version of a classic opposition between educations that also was found in Bourdieu's studies of France). This pattern is interesting in view of the historical opposition in Norwegian society between a well-educated elite of senior civil servants and more popular forces, as reminiscences of this opposition still seems to be active. However, it may now seem that the heirs of the class of civil servants are more prone to defend state involvement and norms of equality than the descendants of ordinary people, although a much more detailed analysis is needed in order to corroborate this. If this is the case, it may appear to be an historical paradox, but considering the mechanisms of social mobility relating to cultural capital it is not, as the institutions that distribute cultural capital and which the reproduction of the elite positions we are talking about very much depend upon, are (so far) also much more state-dependent than elite positions within politics and business.

As we can see from a comparison of figures 1 and 2, the political position taking (shown in figure 2) cannot simply be derived from the oppositions found in the analysis of the capital indicators (shown in figure 1). Even though axis 1 (in figure 2) clearly can be interpreted as a capital structure axis, and we once again find the opposition between cultural and economic capital to be the dominant, the mean point for agents' holding positions at the national political level are found in the same quadrant as the mean point for the leaders of cultural institutions. Despite differences with respect to the average volumes of inherited cultural capital, both tend to defend the role of the State vs the role of market. The interaction between the positions in the social space and the trajectories leading into positions in the field of power (which in both cases, although in different ways, are carriers "linked" to the State), in this case generates similarities with respect to political position taking; high volumes of political and inherited cultural capital stands in opposition to high volumes of economic capital. In this context, the secondary structures in the habituses, embodied through trajectory related and position related experiences, dominate over the primary structures.

Given that one of the central issues in the analysed data set is whether or not the State should be perceived as an ally or an adversary, the distance between the mayors and the other political positions is of particular interest and merits further analysis, also because the mean points for the journalists and the leaders of the trade unions are located in proximity to the other national political positions. We can only speculate whether this is an indication of an internal opposition between high and low volumes of political capital specific to the political field, and simultaneously of a distinct field logic that, while at the same time generating "correct" views of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" political position takings, also works to exclude less central positions from setting the political agenda.

6. Concluding comments.

As cited in the introduction, Aron referred to the structure of the elite as " the relation between various groups in the élite which is peculiar to each society." The above analyses indicate that in the case of Norway, this structure is tri-polar. The point of departure for our construction has not been an a priori defined set of characteristics, but a set of capital indicators related to a set of characteristics of a sample of persons located in specific positions. So far, our analyses indicate that the three identified clusters are not homogenous when it comes to tasks and functions. The most homogenous group is found among leaders in private businesses. At the opposite pole, we find a cluster of positions located in the public sector, but being far more heterogeneous both with respect to tasks and functions. The third, and mainly political cluster is also heterogeneous. Thus, if judged with respect to tasks and functions, it is difficult to claim that the two latter also arrtant businesses and financial institutions in Norway should be owned by Norwegians.

The political control over a number of partly privatised state companies, e.g. Telenor ("Telecom Norway"), Norwegian State Railways and the Postal service, is too weak and should be strengthened

Norwegian investments abroad should follow Norwegian environmental standards for work regulation and environmental protection whenever they are stricter than the local laws.

First generation immigrants convicted for crimes committed in Norway, should be expelled to their country of origin upon ended prison term.

Norwegian soldiers should not participate in NATO-missions that go beyond defending members of the alliance against attacks.

A further regulation of rivers and construction of new hydro power plants should be started.

In Norway, we've come far enough when it comes reducing economic inequalities.

Cultural enterprises, e.g. media and publishers, should mainly be owned by Norwegians.

The way the media criticize power and politics creates an unfortunate distance between decision makers and the rest of the people.

In Norway, the distance between the elites and the population is too large when it comes to real political influence.

The Work Environment Regulation Act has generally been very positive for the development of Norwegian working life.

It is more important to further the level of public services than to reduce taxes.

In Norway, one should favour more privatisation and a smaller public sector.

Violent crimes should be far harsher punished than they are today.

State control over private enterprise should be reduced.

Religious minorities and atheists should be allowed not to take classes in the new "Christianity, religion and view of life" -subject in basic education

We should construct gas driven power plants in Norway, based on the existing technology.

Further constructing of highways, bridges and tunnels in regional parts of Norway should be moderate.

We should favour a society where Christian values play a more important role than they do today.

Immigration levels should be adjusted to labour market demands.

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Economic Sociology and the sociology of economics

What is sociological about the sociology of economics?[1] Some recent developments

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Economics is a well-traveled subject, both by scholars and popular writers. Its history is replete with bestsellers and efforts at vulgarization: every year brings its cortege of books, pamphlets, TV and radio shows, by professional authorities or skilled mavericks, which explain economic mechanisms, theories, facts and trends to vast audiences. The discipline and profession of economics themselves often attract public attention, and at times real controversy. Denunciations of the "dismal science", lost in mathematical sophistication and cut off from the real world, are a recurrent discussion topic in intellectual circles and public opinion outlets.[2]

Yet beyond these popular literatures, the study of economics is also a lively academic specialization. First dominated by historians of economics, this field of research is now being surreptitiously colonized by sociologists. This recent transformation has both expanded the domain of empirical investigation and brought new questions to bear on the study of economics. More importantly, perhaps, it has also shown that the sociology of economics has a distinctive role to play within economic sociology - first and foremost as a source of insight into the formation (and transformation) of economic cultures and ideologies.

The history of economic thought tradition

Most of the scholarly research about economics emanates from a subfield of the discipline called "history of economic thought". Partly because they share a firm and well-institutionalized sense of disciplinary hierarchies and boundaries, economists have always regarded the history of their science as an academic specialty in its own right. From the field's early days as a separate discursive area, it flourished with histories of economic doctrines, textbooks, dictionaries, and encyclopedias, and constantly re-invented its own foundations (Schumpeter (1954), for instance, went back to Aristotle). As a result, it has always been common practice among economists to contribute to the history of economic ideas and theories one way or another, either through exegesis, biography, or intellectual history. For the most part, it was mainly a history about eminent personalities and important texts, although there were brilliant exceptions.[3] Economics is, after all, the only social science to bestow upon its "great men" the same veneration given sometimes to the geniuses of physics. Thus not only are economists granted a Nobel Prize since 1969, but the field possesses a variety of lesser distinctions - a fellowship from the Econometric Society, the Clark medal in the United States, now a "best economist" prize in France- and even an established pantheon in the form of an international *Who's Who in Economics*? (Blaug 1999)[4]

Compared to other social sciences, economists have also been remarkably interested in the epistemological underpinnings of their discipline and in the philosophical assessment of its scientific status. Many prominent economic writers were historically involved in such exercises.[5] Several efforts to reconstruct the history of economics in Popperian and Lakatosian terms took place after World War II. Witnessing the mathematization of the discipline, Popper himself had celebrated its "Newtonian revolution." (1979) And Friedman's 1953 essay was tremendously influential in setting the field's methodology in a positivist framework through the principle of "instrumentalism" - or the notion that the scientific character of economics depends not on its assumptions, which can be unrealistic or even false, but solely on its ability to make predictions.

This, for the most part, is the way the study of economics looked like at mid-century. The ideology was, broadly speaking, positivist: the view that the discipline's development could be understood as an instance of cumulative scientific progress was dominant. Therefore, there existed an established corpus, which constituted the legitimate object of investigation for historians of the discipline.

This traditional model, however, started to collapse in the 1970s, both on the historical and on the methodological fronts. First, from a valuable pastime carried out alongside many productive scientific careers, the history of economics turned into a full-time research enterprise, which set out to contest conventional interpretations, unearth forgotten authors and texts, and rewrite the history of economics with a less strictly exegetic focus. Today the new subfield possesses an influential medium with the review *History of Political Economy (HOPE)* -the principal forum for historians of the discipline- and is organized around a host of specialized national and regional conferences and associations. Intellectual development in economics is increasingly understood as stemming from the interaction of its practitioners with a variety of social and political contexts, rather than as a pure result of individual genius or the cumulative progress of knowledge. Stimulated by Coats' work on the professionalization of British and American economics (1993), historians have thus produced important monographs on the institutionalization of the discipline in various countries.[6] In 1990 *History of Political Economy* started to devote its annual supplements to the institutional development of economics, rather than to its most familiar subject of economic theories and texts.[7] Among the finest products of this revolution in the traditional history of economics is Bernstein's (2001) detailed study of the rise and fall of the economics profession's public purpose over the twentieth century -with a golden age towards the mid-1960s.

The second important development is that the positivist epistemological model came under attack from a variety of standpoints, both within and outside the philosophy of science.[8] One of the most creative attempts in this area was the emergence of a research agenda centered on the rhetoric and style of argumentation in economics, showing that economic writing is carefully constructed to make a rather muddled research process look scientifically rational and objective.[9] Thus McCloskey's (1985) well-known study revealed that much of the standard literary forms found in economic papers (e.g. appeals to authority, analogies, hypothetical toy economics, experimental format) are all rhetorical tools that authors mobilize in order to persuade their readers. In a related vein, Mirowski's (1989) historical account showed that nineteenth century neoclassical economics followed closely the evolution of paradigms within physics, mimicking the latter's intellectual procedures and representation of the world in order to gain scientific status.

Economic science through the lens of science studies

Another remarkable example of the growing maturity of the study of economics as a "field" is the fact that historians and sociologists of science are increasingly turning their attention to it. To a certain extent, this transformation can be considered a far-remote -and long overdue- consequence of the revolution in science studies operated by Kuhn's pathbreaking *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. As is well known, the book, published in 1968, had a considerable impact on the study of science. On the one hand, it provided an alternative framework to positivism for judging the scientific character of a particular research or disciplinary program, by focusing on paradigmatic strength instead of the traditional Popperian criterion of falsifiability.[10] On the other hand, it constituted a powerful assessment of the eminently social character of any scientific practice. In Kuhn's view, science emerges from a complex nexus of social experiences, which are embedded in the routine life of the community of scientists. This line of analysis was then largely expanded by the post-kuhnian "sociology of scientific knowledge" (or SSK).[11]

For the most part, however, the new science studies had largely defined their project around a demystification of research procedures in the *natural* sciences and did not pay much attention to the social scientific disciplines, economics among them.[12] This is dramatically changing today, on both the historical and sociological fronts. Particularly remarkable as a successful attempt to reshape the history of economics from a history of science point of view is Philip Mirowski's 2002 opus on the emergence of game theory. Mirowski (himself an economist) applies to economics the increasingly influential view that cybernetic themes and models, actively engineered by the US military, came to shape the modern sciences in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. Drawing on a breathtaking wealth of archival evidence, Mirowski shows that the origins of game theory (and even, to a certain extent, of modern general equilibrium analysis) are to be found in wartime and post-war exchanges with military operation research, for the most part financed and contracted out to the U.S. Department of Defense.

The work of the Israeli sociologist Yuval Yonay (1994, 1998) provides perhaps one of the most explicit applications of SSK concepts and methodologies to the study of economics.

Applying Bloor's (1976) principles of symmetry and impartiality to the history of economics, Yonay resuscitates institutionalism as a major intellectual player in interwar economics. His 1998 book on intellectual competition in American economics during the interwar offers a complex account of the relationship between the knowledge produced, its pretension to a "scientific" status, and the strategies of the actors sustaining it. Relying on Latour and Callon's actor-network theory, Yonay uses published methodological statements to investigate the controversy between institutionalism and traditional neoclassical theory.[13] The ultimate outcome of the episode (the dismissal of institutionalism and the rise of mathematical economics), he argues, did not inevitably follow from differences in the scientific objectivity of each school's productions, but from repeated "trials of strength" in which each side sought to forge alliances and convince audiences that it better fit an accepted canon of science.

Breslau and Yonay's (1999, 2002) new research program pushes this constructivist line of analysis further. Ambitioning to transfer the model of laboratory studies to the analysis of article writing in economics in order to uncover the field's "epistemic culture" (Knorr-Cetina 1999), Breslau and Yonay show that mathematical modeling is a not simply guided by rhetorical rules, but by embedded disciplinary rules that operate at the level of the field's social structure. After repeatedly interviewing economic authors about the process of article writing, they find that "vaguely defined but generally accepted conventions regarding the movement from [economic] reality to models" (p41) constitute a meta-structure, which effectively constrains the scientific process.

Sociologizing economists

The above-mentioned body of research is fundamentally "science-centered": it is concerned with the production, translation, diffusion of particular economic discourses and ideas. Yet, as Foucault insisted, knowledge wields power: the ability to name and define economic reality is inseparable from the ability to act upon this reality. To use Callon's phrase, the distinctiveness of economics as a science is its fundamentally "performative" character. The way in which the relationship between economics and reality has been often framed, he argues, is quite misleading: It is not so much that economists observe and describe how the economy functions. Rather, "economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy" (1998, p2). Sociologists, then, should turn their attention towards the "embeddedness of markets in economics" -and study how economic ideas routinely construct and transform economies.

The idea is very elegantly and powerfully put. Part of it is not new: an important body of institutionalist scholarship already deals explicitly with the influence of economic ideas on policy (Weir and Skocpol 1985; Hall 1989; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996; Campbell 1998; Stryker 1989; Campbell and Petersen 2001) or with the massive "economicization" of public bureaucracies and political elites that has accompanied the turn toward neo-liberal policies (Markoff and Montecinos 1993 and forthcoming; Centeno 1994; Loureiro 1996; Centeno and Silva 1998; Eyal 2000; Babb 2001; Dezalay and Garth 2002). One way or another, these works address the question of the shifting status of economics as a professional practice with transformative power.

It is unfortunately impossible in the space allowed to review the vast intellectual territory covered by all these works. I will, therefore, limit myself to discuss a few original perspectives in this new "macro" sociology of the economics profession. Admittedly, the tradition is quite heterogeneous, and draws its analytical tools from a large variety of theoretical sources, from Bourdieusian "field" analysis to Abbott's theory of the professions and comparative political sociology. One common insight, however, is the idea that the study of economics should not limit itself to the bounded world of disciplinary discourse and scientific productions, but involves a much broader set of social objects, organizations, and practices. Rather than taking the object "economics" as given and scrutinizing its internal operation in great detail, this tradition adopts an "externalist" perspective that questions how the object itself is socially constructed by the broader social context. In other words, one of the key questions addressed by this literature concerns not how people write or do economics, but who is authorized to speak about, or act upon, the economy, and why.

My own work (Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001 and forthcoming) is an attempt to put some of these themes in a comparative perspective, and to understand the sociological mechanisms upon which such authority is constructed across countries. I rely on an historical study of the institutionalization of economics in the United States, Great Britain and France since the end of the nineteenth century to show that political cultures and institutions in these three countries gave rise to very different economics professions and disciplines: In Great Britain, for instance, an amateur gentry oriented to public service produced a scientistic profession organized around elite institutions and personalities, that nevertheless relies greatly on the institutions of civil society - e.g. political parties, the press, and interpersonal networks - to convey its ideas to policy-makers. In the United States, the absence of elite state technocrats meant that political institutions created a market for "depoliticized", technical, economic expertise. This produced a strong institutional basis for an economics discipline that is profoundly rooted in the imperatives of empirical relevance and scientific quantification. Finally, in France the centralizing nature of political institutions long conflicted with the economists' commitments in favor of free trade and laissez faire. The state remained reluctant to grant formal recognition to economic discourse, which resulted in a slow and limited incorporation of the discipline in university education. At the same time, it actively sponsored administratively-based forms of economic knowledge, which, after World War II especially, gave rise to a powerful and fairly autonomous sector of scientific production.

While the analysis above tends to privilege differences *across* countries, the work of Lebaron (1997, 2000) and Dezalay and Garth (2002) exemplifies best a "field" approach centered on the power struggles *within* national fields of economic knowledge. The sociologist's task, in this view, is to map out the different segments involved in the contest for legitimacy, to understand the logic of positions, and to describe the dynamics that underlie transformations in the field's social and intellectual structure. Applying Bourdieusian field theory to the study of French economics, Lebaron (1997, 2000) sets out to reveal the sociological mechanisms that preside over the construction of a "belief" in economics in modern societies. One way to achieve this is by showing that economics is eminently a science of power. Through detailed empirical study, Lebaron shows that the social characteristics of economists largely explain their position within the scientific space: Occupational location and intellectual stance in economics are basically split along the two Bourdieusian dimensions of the volume and structure of capital, and both spaces are homologically related. Another way is by documenting extensively the progressive construction of a quasi-religious belief in markets, sanctified by the authority of science, and particularly noticeable in the neo-liberal evolution of French economics training, research, and economic policy.

Dezalay and Garth (2002), whose book was reviewed in the last edition of this newsletter, similarly rely on field analysis -but translate it to the global level. Turning their internationally legitimate forms of scientific capital into politico-administrative capital, economists, they argue, have entered Latin American public bureaucracies and political elites *en masse* since the 1970s, ultimately displacing the traditional supremacy of gentlemen-lawyers over economic governance. Part of this movement was set in motion by developments within the North-American academic field -including power struggles between different segments of the profession that were "exported" and played out in the South. These processes of transformation were highly uneven across countries, however, and largely shaped by domestic institutions (the authors examine closely the cases of Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Brazil).

Though she is more sensitive to the interaction between elite competition and the grassroots context, Babb (2001) conveys a similar point in her study of the transformations of Mexican economics over the twentieth century (her main reference, however, is Abbott's model of professional competition, not Bourdieu's field dynamics). *Managing Mexico* describes the dramatic evolution of post-war Mexican economic ideology from "developmentalism" to "neoliberalism" as a consequence of ideological struggles in the society at large and, in particular, the radicalization of Mexican student politics in the 1960s and 1970s. The financial side of the technocracy responded to these challenges by actively sponsoring conservative economics training programs and tightening its connections with American universities, thereby engineering the stock of expertise on which the neoliberal transition would be ultimately built.

The question of transnational linkages and networks certainly represents one of the most exciting research avenues in the sociology of economics today. Beyond Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia constitute the next frontier for students of economic knowledge. A good example is Bockman and Eyal's (2002) recent demonstration that the roots of East European neo-liberal transitions are to be found in the 1950s transnational debate about socialist economic calculation, and in the Cold-War era exchanges between economic reformers in Eastern Europe and libertarian social scientists in the United States and Britain. By underlying the role of individual networks and historical continuities, Bockman and Eyal dismiss easy explanations of the socialist transition to the market in terms of U.S. made intellectual exports.

The sociology of economics as economic sociology

The studies discussed above suggest that economic sociologists should care deeply about the sociology of economics - if only because it touches upon fundamental questions regarding economic representations, the organization of economies, and the formation and transformation of economic policy (as the expanding literature on the role of economists in neoliberal transitions plainly demonstrates).

But more importantly, as Callon remarked (1998), economic sociologists should care because we are still far from understanding properly the relationship between economics and the economy -between scientific representations and the construction of economies, between the production of tools for apprehending and dealing with the world and the redefinition of the world through the tools themselves. The performative power of economics goes well beyond and above the influence of economists as scientists, experts, professionals, or ideologues.

The task of a sociology of economics, therefore, has only begun.

Notes

1. This title is an allusion to the title of an article by Jens Beckert (1996)
2. As Krugman argues provocatively, 'economist-bashing has long been a popular past-time among intellectuals right and left' (1996, p13). See for instance John Cassidy, 1996, 'The Decline of Economics', The New Yorker, December 16; Robert Kuttner, 1985, 'The Poverty of Economics', Atlantic Monthly, February, p74-84. Paul Ormerod, The Death of Economics, 1994.
3. See for instance (in this century) Schumpeter, 1954; Heckscher, Mercantilism, 1935; Stigler, Essays in the History of Economics, 1965.
4. Also see Backhouse and Middleton, 2000.
5. J.S. Mill, 1987; Cairnes, 1875; J.N. Keynes, 1891; Robbins, 1984; Hayek, 1967; Friedman, 1953; Blaug, 1992 are the most prominent in this second group. See Hausman, 1994, for a collection of statements by economists on these issues, and Redman, 1989, and 1991, for an extensive bibliography on the epistemology of economics.

6. See notably: Maloney, 1985; Koot, 1987; Kadish, 1982; 1989; Middleton, 1998. A collective effort by distinguished historians of economics also provided us with five volumes on the history of the institutionalization of the discipline in different countries at the end of the nineteenth century. (Barber, 1993 on the United States; Waszek, 1988 on Germany; Kadish and Tribe, 1993 on the United Kingdom; Sugiyama and Mizuta, 1988 on Japan; LeVan-Lemesle, 1991 on France) Also see Guillén, 1989, on Spain. Pioneering

works in this area include Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis (1954), which, if centered around the discussion of analytical progress in economics, nonetheless offers detailed insights into the historical (both institutional and intellectual) context of economic discourse. Finally, see Whitley (1984, 1987) and Coats (1993) for efforts to offer a sociological theory of the development of Anglo-Saxon economics.
7. See in particular, among this series of edited volumes: Morgan and Rutherford, 1999 on the American interwar; Coats, 1997 on the post-1945 internationalization of economics; Goodwin, 1991, on 'economics and national security'; Coats, 1999, on the post-1945 evolution of economics in Western Europe.
8. See for instance critiques by Blaug, 1980 and Caldwell 1980, 1982.
9. In addition to the works mentioned in this paragraph, see Klamer et al., 1988.
10. This aspect is literally put to practice by Canterberry and Burckardt's epistemological assessment of the status of economic knowledge. (1983) They argue that, while economics can be considered a science in the kuhnian sense (it possesses a rather unitary paradigm), it is clearly not one in the popperian sense of being able to make falsifiable propositions.
11. See Shapin, 1995, for an overview of the field.
12. But see Porter 1995.
13. Yonay's data consists of "all the articles which were classified under the title 'Methodology' in the Index of Economic Articles 1924-1939." (1998, p27)

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PUBLICATION ANNOUNCEMENTS

. Michael Lounsbury and Marc J. Ventresca (eds.), 2002. Social Structure and Organizations Revisited. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* (JAI Press/Elsevier), vol. 19, Sam Bacharach, series editor.

This volume re-engages Stinchcombe's (1965) classic essay "Social structure and organizations," with original papers that extend this tradition with empirical studies of organizations and stratification, entrepreneurship, politics, and ideas and meanings in diverse economic and institutional contexts. The volume includes an introductory essay, nine empirical chapters, and three commentary essays, as well as a new postscript by Stinchcombe. The project charts an agenda for research on social structure and organization that gives a central place to culture, stratification, power and domination, and historical contingency in the idiom of Weber and the Pragmatist tradition of historical institutionalism.

See the Elsevier website for featured RSO listing with TOC/contributors:
http://www.elsevier.com/inca/publications/store/6/2/2/7/5/9/

. Andrew Hoffman and Marc J. Ventresca (eds.), 2002. Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives (Stanford University Press).

The papers in this volume introduce new theory and empirical work in institutional and organizational analysis of environmental policy and environmental management. The books explores how contested policy domains such as the environment challenge and redirect existing institutional theories of organization. A secondary focus is the contributions of organization theory to policy studies.

Contributors include researchers from environmental sociology, organization theory and management, business strategy, and institutional and comparative sociology. The empirical chapters are set off by the editors' introduction, concluding commentaries by W. Richard Scott and John Ehrenfeld, and a foreward by John W. Meyer.

Conference announcements

. Call for Papers

The Economic Sociology Research Network of the ESA shall organise eight sessions in the Sixth European Sociological Association Conference, which is to take place in Murcia, Spain, 23-26 September, 2003.

Colleagues wishing to participate are invited to submit electronically an ABSTRACT of 300 words approx. to the ESRN co-chairs, along with their particulars and their complete postal and electronic address.
Send your abstract to: http://www.um.es/ESA/comunicacion_ingles.htm

The following list of topics/themes should serve as a guide but proposals that do not fit directly into these themes will also be welcomed.

- Economic Sociology and Sociological Theory
- Culture and Economy
- Economic Sociology of Work and Family
- The Economic Sociology of Capitalism
- The Economic Sociology of Institutions
- Civil Society, the State and the Economy
- Open Stream in Economic Sociology
- Open Stream in Economic Sociology

Deadlines
Deadline for submitting abstracts: end of February 2003.
Authors will be notified whether their abstract has been accepted for presentation by April 30, 2003.
Accepted abstracts: Authors should submit their papers to the network organisers

electronically by the 15th of July, 2003.

For more information and other deadlines concerning the conference itself (e.g. fees, book of abstract, accommodation, venue, etc.) colleagues should consult the Conference WebPages regularly at: http://www.um.es/ESA/

Also consult the ESA WebPages at: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/
Economic Sociology Research Network Co-chairs
Patrik Aspers: patrik.aspers@sociology.su.se
Sokratis Koniordos: skoni@social.soc.uoc.gr

. Call for Papers
Dear Colleagues,
In the context of the 36th World Congress, the International Institute of Sociology, Beijing, July 7-11, 2003, organised by the "International Institute of Sociology" and the "Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)", there will be a session (No 51), titled:
"Adaptations to Globalisation: The role of social capital"

Colleagues wishing to participate are invited to submit electronically an ABSTRACT in English of up to 300 words approx., along with their particulars and their complete postal and electronic address.
Please send your abstract to: Sokratis Koniordos: skoni@social.soc.uoc.gr

Abstract: "Adaptations to Globalisation: The role of social capital" (Session 51)

The proposed session's aim is to focus on the role of the social capital as a major ingredient in the organisation of the response of local societies (or particular social groups in them) to the forces of globalisation. The claim is that when social capital is well developed in the local society, and when available in sufficient amounts, it tends to strengthen the web of the social relations that enhances and overall positively affects the particular society's adaptive capacity. This may be seen to have positive implications in the sense that globalisation-related interactions and impacts can be absorbed and benefit local society.
Alternatively, the lack of social capital, or its feebleness, may be viewed to contribute to the social disembeddedness of local social institutions, processes and practices that, in turn, facilitates the surrender rather than the adaptation of local societies to the forces of globalisation. In such instances the increasing density of the more global (and thus stretched) social relations, brought about by the intensification of economic, political and socio-cultural flows and the growth of global interconnectedness, may have negative and even stultifying effects for local societies.
Papers sought include both macro and micro-level case study analyses on the impact of social capital in responses to globalisation; more general comparative or/and theoretical discussions and explorations are also welcomed.

Organizer: Prof. Sokratis Koniordos, Dept. of Sociology, University of Crete
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Contact at CASS: Mr Zhan Shaohua
E-mail: zhanshaohuacass@yahoo.com

Deadlines
Deadline for submitting abstracts: 30th of April 2003.
Authors will be notified whether their abstract has been accepted for presentation by 5th of May 2003.
Accepted abstracts: Authors should submit their papers to the organiser electronically by the 15th of June 2003.

For more information and other deadlines concerning the conference itself (e.g. registration & fees, book of abstract, accommodation, venue, etc.) you should consult the Conference WebPages regularly at:
http://www.iis2003beijing.com.cn/en/index.htm
or
contact Mr Zhan Shaohua, at: zhanshaohuacass@yahoo.com

. **Beyond Traditional Employment**
Industrial Relations in the Network Economy
13th World Congress of the International Industrial Relations Association (IIRA)
September 8 - 12, 2003
Free University of Berlin, Germany

Germany has the honor and the privilege to host a World Congress of the IIRA. Over 1,000 academics and practitioners in the fields of industrial relations and HRM from all around the world are expected to attend the Congress. The Congress is scheduled to be held on the campus of the Free University - FU Berlin. The Federal Minister of Economics and Labour, the Confederation of German Employers' Associations and the German Trade Union Federation are cooperating partners.

The congress will be organized in five tracks:
(1) Enterprise reorganization: Negotiated, consultative or unilateral?
(2) Changing contours of the employment relationship and new modes of labor regulation
(3) Industrial relations and global labor standards
(4) Collective actors in industrial relations: What future?
(5) European integration: Convergence or diversity?

Workshop sessions with invited papers will be complemented by a broad range of special seminars. A Pre-Congress will offer ample opportunity to learn about the German system of industrial relations through an introductory seminar and company visits. The official conference languages will be English, German, and Spanish. A number of scholarships are available for those who have submitted an abstract.
Berlin is not only the new capital of a united Germany, it is a vibrantly cosmopolitan metropolis which has gone through an extensive process of rebuilding and new construction. Its cultural and architectural treasures are reknowned, and as a melting pot of East and West the city provides an unrivaled perspective on the German model of adaptation and change to meet the challenges of today.

For more information on the program please visit www.fu-berlin.de/iira2003. The web site also provides the opportunity for conference registration, accommodation booking and the selection of opportunities for cultural activities outside the Congress in Berlin.

Professor Joerg Sydow, FU Berlin
Chairman of the Executive Committee
German Section of the IIRA
sydow@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de

Appel à communication

La revue Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit publiera au début de l'année 2004 un numéro consacré à

la sociologie de la comptabilité.

Les articles peuvent concerner des sujets pris dans les trois domaines d'intérêt de la revue: les comptabilités, le contrôle de gestion et l'audit.

Ils doivent mobiliser des cadres conceptuels et des auteurs français ou étrangers de la sociologie dans le traitement des questions abordées. Des contributions provenant de chercheurs en sciences de gestion mais aussi de chercheurs en sociologie sont les bienvenues.

Les articles pourront porter tant sur les acteurs que sur les instruments et les pratiques.

Trois grands groupes thématiques seront privilégiés :

1) comptabilité-contrôle-audit et pouvoir (mots-clés : phénomènes de pouvoir, rapports de forces, jeux politiques, gouvernementalité, domination, conflits sociaux),

2) comptabilité-contrôle-audit et institutions (mots-clés : légitimité, représentations sociales, idéologie, normes et règles du jeu social, régimes politico-économiques),

3) comptabilité-contrôle-audit et groupes sociaux (mots-clés : classes sociales, genre, professions, mouvements sociaux).

Une priorité sera accordée aux articles s'appuyant sur des études de terrain.

Coordination du numéro :

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Les propositions d'articles au format de la revue sont à envoyer en 4 exemplaires sur support papier et sous forme électronique pour le 30 septembre 2003 à :

Jocelyne Diot, Département comptabilité-contrôle, Groupe HEC, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, _ 01.39.67.72.32, sociocompta@hec.fr