Building a Neoliberal Palestinian State under Closure: The Economic and Spatial Implications of Walls and Barriers

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From Dependency to Neoliberalism

In 1947 economic sociologist Karl Polanyi pointed out that the market economy had created a new type of society (Polanyi 1947: 111): in this society, market logic pervades every aspect of life, organizations are presumed to be subject to the principle of economic determinism, and human nature is supposed to be describable in terms of “homo oeconomicus.” He called upon the scholarly community to recognize the fallacy of such assumptions and reminded us that humans are not just economic, but also social beings. However, due to the institutional conquests of mainstream economics and its impact on policy-making (Yonay 1994), Karl Polanyi’s words were soon forgotten.

By the late 1970s and 1980s, as policy-makers faced a global recession and a crisis in the “Keynesian” welfare state, neoliberal policies were introduced to remake societies and their economies. Sprung on by global hegemons such as the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – neoliberalism became the dominant political and ideological force shaping capitalist globalization. Developing economies, from the Middle East to Sub-Saharan Africa, which were still reverberating from the consequences of colonization, were supposed to remake their economies by following the “free market” dictates of the global hegemons.

In an increasingly globalized and interdependent world, the developmental trajectories of neither Palestine in the Middle East nor the Democratic Republic of Congo in Sub-Saharan Africa can be understood in isolation. Instead:

Neoliberal restructuring projects … have been produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles. (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 349)

The contextual embeddedness of such restructuring projects has produced policies, institutions, and regulatory landscapes that have left minimal “policy space” (Khalidi and Samour 2011: 12) for local stakeholders, apart from negotiations and struggles over the prescribed neoliberal market reforms. Indeed, in order for leaders from the Global South to be heard in economic policy discussions, they have had to “learn to speak the language of the hegemonic discourse, the language of neoliberalism” (Owusu 2003: 1665). Consequently, economic development – whether in Palestine or the DR Congo – has become path-dependent on the dictates of the neoliberal paradigm. “Open” markets are supposed to help in building up non-existing or weak states and strengthening their capacities, while “open-door policies” – characterized by deregulation, privatization, and an influx of foreign capital and investment – were supposed to bolster developing economies.

Against the backdrop of a global neoliberal market place, the Palestinian national liberation movement, which had emerged in the early 1960s, was superseded by a Palestinian state-building program that is supposed to be achieved through neoliberal institution-building. What neither political activism, armed struggle, nor peaceful negotiation were able to deliver, neoliberalism was to accomplish: national liberation (Khalidi and Samour 2011; Samara 2000; PNA 2009). Palestinians were to attain national independence with the IMF, the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the United States channeling economic policies and investments, and with the occupying power, Israel, on their side. The Palestinian economy was therefore “designed from the very beginning by the policies and prescriptions of globalizing institutions” (Samara 2000: 21).
For instance, export-oriented industrial zones were created in response to donor recommendations and in line with the Palestinian Authorities’ (PAs’) neoliberal policies (Tartir 2013). Cross-border industrial parks were to attract international or Israeli capital, make use of cheap local labor, and achieve growth through exports. Observers are divided over the effectiveness of such neoliberal initiatives:

The PA, its international sponsors, and the PA-dependent private sector see the industrial zones as a pillar of the state-building effort that will bolster the Palestinian economy and achieve sustainable development. The zones’ critics argue that they reinforce and legitimize the occupation by making the Palestinians even more subservient to Israel given that the PA has to rely on the occupiers’ good will for access, movement and for transfer of tax revenues. (Tartir 2013: 1)

For Gadi Algazi (2006), such “offshoring at home” – whether in industrial parks or Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – serves political interests by colonizing and managing land and resources, and caters to economic and capitalist interests. Moreover, observers from the Global South have pointed out that, ever since colonial times, such economic arrangements have tended to enrich local and international elites, while local infrastructure, resources, and human capital have remained untapped and underdeveloped. At the same time, while raw materials, minerals, and resources hemorrhage away to supply the high energy-consuming developed world, economic aid packages to developing economies have tended only to exacerbate dependency relations. Aid is not trade and does not open up markets, which is so important for a country’s economic viability (Owusu 2003; Sen 1999). In the Palestinian case, economic dependency had already been a long time coming.

To be sure, Palestinian economic life has never escaped its symbiotic relationship with Israel. After its 1967 war with neighboring states Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Israel more than tripled the territory under its control, occupying formerly Jordanian (West Bank and East Jerusalem), Egyptian (Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula), and Syrian (Golan Heights)-controlled territories. As a result, the 1949 armistice line – also known as the Green Line – that up until then had been the de facto border between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, was turned into a merely administrative line; its function as a border became virtually obsolete. The subsequent influx of unskilled and semi-skilled Palestinian workers into Israel has been part and parcel of the Israeli economic miracle. Indeed:

During the 1970s and 1980s, almost one third of Palestinian employment was in relatively well waged Israeli jobs and by 1988, whole rural communities came to depend entirely on work in Israel … Due to their dependency on easily accessible, low-skill wage labor, these communities have undergone a process of de-development, stemming from the deskilling of the labor force, and from the lack of incentives to develop local economic infrastructure and resources independently of Israel. (UN/UNESCO 2005: 14–17)

While the fact that Palestine became Israel’s economically dependent auxiliary may have temporarily stabilized its economy, it also simultaneously contributed to the under-development of local Palestinian industries and markets, stifled the diversification of local job opportunities, exacerbated the deskilling of the Palestinian population, and was a factor in the de-development of the Palestinian Territory (UN/UNESCO 2005; Roy 1987).

The I and II Intifada and the Oslo Accords: Conditions for Economic Fragmentation

With the start of the first Intifada in 1987, however, the Israeli government re-imposed the Green Line’s function as a full-fledged border. As a result, legal economic interchange was minimized – unlike cross-border criminal activities, which flourished – and foreign workers from Thailand, China, and Romania started to replace the former Palestinian workforce within Israel. Until 1993, economic links between the West Bank and Israel came to a virtual standstill, with severe economic consequences for West Bank Palestinians (Brawer 2002). However, with the beginning of the peace process and the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords I, Palestinians were assured limited self-government. “Oslo” was to reduce Palestinian dependency on Israel and provide the conditions for Palestine’s economic sustainability. At the time, the Palestinian Territories were divided into territorial entities that were subject to different types of Israeli and/or Palestinian rule. The West Bank was not only split into Areas A (under Palestinian civilian and military control), B (under Palestinian civilian control and Israeli military control), and C (under Israeli civilian and military control), but was also severed from Gaza (Figure 1).

See Appendix, Figure 1

This territorial arrangement provided the condition for the bifurcation of the West Bank territory. In fact, the 1995 Oslo II agreements:
turned the West Bank into a series of cantons separated from each other by areas under Israeli control ... by December 1999 the Oslo agreements had created 227 separate areas in the West Bank under full or partial control of the PA. The overwhelming majority of these areas ... are less than 2 km² in size. Most important, Israel controlled the territory between these enclaves, effectively turning them into bantustans. (Roy 2001: 11)

This territorial fragmentation brought about a "Bantustanization" of land and labor (Farsakh 2002). This spatial reality transformed "Palestinian areas into de facto labor reserves out of which Palestinians cannot easily exit without a permit issued by the Israeli authorities" (Farsakh 2002: 14).

The encirclement of Palestinian-controlled territories by Israeli-controlled roads, settlements, and territories to which Palestinians have limited or no access has fragmented the region into social and economic islands (World Bank 2010), that are surrounded by an array of physical, administrative, and legal barriers and closures. This territorial fragmentation, instead of enabling economic development, has contributed to the West Bank's economic fragmentation and disintegration and has curtailed economic opportunities.

Indeed, the modus vivendi crafted by the Oslo Accords I has resulted in what Palestinian anthropologist Khalil Nakhleh (2014) has dubbed "economic neo-colonialism." This characterizes the dual process of settler colonization and donor-led economic neoliberal policies that favor foreign investment and an export-oriented growth strategy, complemented by foreign aid (Samara 2000). Consequently, since 1994 the PA has received approximately 23 billion US dollars in aid, and now has an internal and external debt of over 4.3 billion US dollars. As a result, the PA has been unable to pay the wages of over 170,000 public employees at the end of each calendar month (Nakhleh 2014). The Palestinian economy remains highly dependent not only on international aid, but also on the Israeli economy, as 90 percent of Palestinian trade is channeled through the Israeli market, over 70 percent of Palestinian consumer goods are imported, and only 30 percent are produced locally (Karim/Farray/Tamari 2010: 40–45). For Sara Roy (2001), it was this post-Oslo reality of "cantonization" and the encirclement of the Palestinian community by a web of physical and bureaucratic obstacles that, together with stalemate in the peace negotiations in the late 1990s, contributed to Palestinians’ collective dismay, which reached its apogee in the second Intifada.

Cantonization and the Wall System

In the wake of the second Intifada in 2000 Israeli security concerns have increasingly overridden the economic viability of the Palestinian Territories. Indeed:

Movement and access restrictions have defined Palestinian economic and social well-being for two decades, and dramatically so since 2000. (World Bank 2010: 11)

While the Oslo process had left Palestinian society weakened and fractured, the increase in various closure mechanisms after 2000 constituted a "shock" to the Palestinian economic system (UN/UNESCO 2005). In 2002 the Israeli government started to build the Separation Wall, which is adjacent to, yet diverging from, the internationally recognized 1949 armistice line between Israel and the West Bank. When completed, it is projected to be 721 km long (525 km of which is to run within West Bank territory) and will be more than twice as long as the Green Line.

Already the early Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky used the metaphor of an "Iron Wall," emphasizing the need for a strong Jewish presence in Palestine that would eventually force Palestinian Arabs to accept the Zionist colonization of their land. He argued that, as any native population would never voluntarily agree to being colonized:

the only way to obtain such an agreement is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present.

Indeed, the Wall and "the closure creates a colonial ‘there’ and ‘here’ of a new kind, nicely separated" (Algazi, 2014:4). While Israeli peace activists and critics have questioned the closures and the construction of the Wall as a continuation of long-standing policies of colonization, for most people the closures sustain a separation of the Jewish state from the allegedly hazardous, dangerous, and uncivilized "other" (see, for example, Bar-Tal/Antebi 1992).

It was, however, not until 2002, at the height of the second Intifada, that the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon solidified Vladimir Jabutinsky’s metaphorical vision into bricks, mortar, and steel wire (Shlaim 2000). The terms used to describe the West Bank barrier are iconic examples for evoking certain cultural meanings and political stances. While for the Israeli government the barrier is a political...
device for implementing a new national security policy, for the Palestinian government it is a repressive measure that encroaches on their territory, restricting mobility and destroying the livelihoods, social fabric, and welfare of Palestinian communities. Such diverse meanings inform the terms used to describe the barrier. While for its proponents it is the “Security Fence” or “Anti-Terrorist Fence,” signifying permeability, transparency, movability, security, and good neighborliness – as in Robert Frost’s poem, “Mending Wall,” which suggests that “good fences make good neighbors” – for its opponents it is the “Apartheid,” “Segregation,” “Separation,” “Colonization,” “Demographic,” or “Annexation Wall,” underscoring its ethnic, territorial, and political implications.

Israel’s Separation Barrier is neither an isolated phenomenon nor an anomaly in today’s globalized world. Rather, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a “new age of the wall” has emerged. The renaissance of walls, barriers, and fences and the emergence of a hardening of borders around the globe has been spurred by the post-1989 “new age of the border industry” (Vallet/David 2013), but it is also the summation of previously established Israeli-imposed barriers post-Oslo. Indeed, the Wall is part of a “wall system” that contains various exclusionary administrative policies and physical obstacles, which have been developed over decades (Weizman 2004: 5; Zink 2009). Exclusionary policies comprise restrictive permit systems that are administered by the Civil Administration’s District Coordination and Liaison Office (DCL), which regulates Palestinians’ movement across the West Bank and into Israel, and physical obstacles, including (as of 2014) over 490 closure mechanisms,7 such as manned checkpoints, temporary roadblocks, Jewish settlements, and Israeli-controlled no-go areas, as well as the “forbidden road system” (which includes roads primarily for Israeli use to which Palestinian access is regulated or prevented). As a result, the Wall has increased the already pervasive disintegration of the West Bank “into a series of Palestinian enclaves. Each Palestinian enclave is geographically separated from the other by some form of Israeli infrastructure, including settlements, outposts, military areas, nature reserves and the Barrier” (UN OCHA 2007: 70). Consequently, the post-2000 territorial-legal geopolitics and spatial arrangements have brought about an “economic fragmentation” (UN/UNESCO 2005: 10) that has entailed the breakdown of economic relations with Israel, between districts within the West Bank, producers and their markets, and employers and their employees, as well as between rural and urban communities, resulting in forcibly accelerated urbanization.

Walls are also where politics intersects with economics. While some critics underscore the cost of walls and closures to governments (Hever 2013), others point out that they are part of a “security-industrial complex” that has made security a growth industry and a profitable business (Vallet et al. 2013). Not only military companies and homeland security industries, but also international oil companies and arms manufacturers have managed to increase their growth. For instance, companies such as the Israeli firm Elbit have won lucrative contracts to provide security surveillance technology for the US–Mexican border (Haaretz and Reuters 2014).

Not only is Israel’s Wall/Fence part of a global trend towards re-bordering national, territorial, or ethnic boundaries, and fits in with the economic logic of an ever-growing “border industry” (Vallet/David 2013), but it is also the summation of previously established Israeli-imposed barriers post-Oslo. Indeed, the Wall is part of a “wall system” that contains various exclusionary administrative policies and physical obstacles, which have been developed over decades (Weizman 2004: 5; Zink 2009). Exclusionary policies comprise restrictive permit systems that are administered by the Civil Administration’s District Coordination and Liaison Office (DCL), which regulates Palestinians’ movement across the West Bank and into Israel, and physical obstacles, including (as of 2014) over 490 closure mechanisms,7 such as manned checkpoints, temporary roadblocks, Jewish settlements, and Israeli-controlled no-go areas, as well as the “forbidden road system” (which includes roads primarily for Israeli use to which Palestinian access is regulated or prevented). As a result, the Wall has increased the already pervasive disintegration of the West Bank “into a series of Palestinian enclaves. Each Palestinian enclave is geographically separated from the other by some form of Israeli infrastructure, including settlements, outposts, military areas, nature reserves and the Barrier” (UN OCHA 2007: 70). Consequently, the post-2000 territorial-legal geopolitics and spatial arrangements have brought about an “economic fragmentation” (UN/UNESCO 2005: 10) that has entailed the breakdown of economic relations with Israel, between districts within the West Bank, producers and their markets, and employers and their employees, as well as between rural and urban communities, resulting in forcibly accelerated urbanization.

The Geopolitics of Closures: Forced Urbanization and Spacio-cide

The “economic neo-colonialism” that has interlinked colonialism with neoliberalism has also gone hand in hand with “spacio-cide” and its socio-economic consequences (Farsakh 2002; Nakhleh 2014; Yiftachel 2009).8 For Sari Hanafi (2009) the Israeli colonial project in the Palestinian Territory is indeed “spacio-cidal” in that it targets the landscape. It is a “spacio-cidal” project in an age of literal agrophobia – the fear of space and its presumably hostile human elements – which leads to the fragmentation of landscape, its elimination for Palestinians, and its annexation and control by the Israeli state. As a result, Palestinians’ spatial realities have developed in line with neoliberal geographical transformations around the globe. There have been “geographically uneven, socially regressive, and politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change” that are associated with neoliberal “reforms”, which have brought about the “creative destruction” of “political-economic spaces at multiple geographical scales” (Brenner/Theodore 2002: 349). Arguably, Palestinian spatiality and therefore the ability for it to be administered on the basis of political sovereignty has been “creatively destroyed” by the fraught geopolitics of the region.
The neo-colonial spatial reorganization of space into an ethnically bifurcated territory and Palestinians’ loss of territorial control over land and natural resources (Lavorel 2013) have driven peasants and residents off the land and into urban centers. Israeli and Ottoman laws continue to be utilized to rearrange the ethnic geography of Israel/Palestine (Kadar 2001), causing an influx of Palestinians into their cities. Almost three-quarters of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are urbanized (81 percent in the Gaza Strip and 69 percent in the West Bank) (PCBS 2010: 205). The eruption of the first Intifada in 1987 and the subsequent dissemination of closure mechanisms across the territories rapidly accelerated this urbanization process (El-Atrash 2014: 27–29), as well as the outflow of Palestinians from the Palestinian Territory.

The construction of the Wall further limited the availability of land for future spatial development by isolating approximately 9.4 percent of the West Bank’s territory in the “seam zone,” the territory trapped between the Wall and the Green Line (UNOCHA 2013). While the areas for spatial development are ever shrinking due to the “wall system,” Palestinian demographic growth rates have been rising rapidly, increasing the population density in urban areas by 34 percent between 2002 and 2013 (see El-Atrash 2014: 27; Coon 1992; PCBS 2007), while population density in rural areas has decreased. This sudden increase is due to many factors related to the Israeli-imposed closures (most importantly the Wall), which have forced Palestinians to move from the ever more sparsely populated rural areas into the main urban centers in order to have better access to social services, such as hospitals, schools, and universities.

The Wall and closures have transformed Palestinians’ relationship to their agrarian landscape by replacing traditional links to the land with modernist capitalist notions of the utility, production-capacity, and profitability of land (Anani 2007). On top of that, the accelerated migration from Palestinian rural areas to the urban centers has negatively affected the agricultural production-consumption cycle of agri-economics. On the other hand, there has been a dramatic increase in the urban service sector (Yiftachel 2009). Indeed, the urban service sector produces the largest share of Palestinian GDP (26.9 percent in the Gaza Strip and 17.7 percent in the West Bank (PCBS 2013:55)). The city of Bethlehem provides a representative case for analyzing the socio-economic repercussions of the Wall and its effect on rural de-development and urban conglomeration.

Bethlehem has developed and expanded over the past few years and now constitutes the urban hub and service center of the Bethlehem city-area, which also includes Beit Jala and Beit Sahour. The Wall was started at Rachel’s Tomb, on Bethlehem’s northern border with Jerusalem. It now extends to 74.8 km (with only 3.2 km being aligned with the Green Line) and segregates 159,793 dunums from Bethlehem’s city-region (POICA 2009), which occupies 607.8 km² of land and has 199,466 inhabitants (PCBS 2012). Due to the geo-political territorial arrangements established in the 1995 Oslo II agreement, more than 94 percent of Bethlehem’s residents live in less than 14 percent of the city-region’s total area, which falls under Areas A and B and are therefore under Palestinian planning jurisdiction (ARIJ 2013). In the remaining area, classified as Area C and thus under Israeli control, the Wall and the settlements perpetuate a matrix of Israeli infrastructures that occupy more than 18 km² of Bethlehem city-region’s land.

The Wall compartmentalizes Bethlehem’s city-region into three spatial zones: the “eastern” and “western zones,” as well as the “urban center” (see Figure 2). The urban center is the main service provider for the region and contains many archeological and tourist sites, including the Church of the Nativity, that was built over the cave that marks the birthplace of Jesus. It houses 94 percent of the total population of the city-region. Unlike, the “urban center,” the “eastern” and “western zones” are under Israeli control and are sparsely populated. The “eastern zone” is dominated by Israeli settlements, outposts, by-pass roads, and closed military areas, which sever Bethlehem’s city-area from the Dead Sea, a tourist attraction with great economic potential. The “western zone” – which is known as Bethlehem’s “breadbasket” – is crisscrossed by the Wall, affecting 25,000 inhabitants in nine Palestinian rural communities, severing peasants from their lands and hindering residents’ access to social services in the urban center. Upon completion of the Wall in that region, the “western zone” will be the largest “seam zone” in the West Bank.

Before the outbreak of the second Intifada approximately 18 percent of waged workers in Bethlehem were employed in the tourist industry (UNOCHA/UNESCO 2004: 14). After the Wall’s construction, both the tourist and the agricultural sector’s contribution to the local economy...
rapidly diminished, and they employed only 4.3 percent and 1 percent of Bethlehem’s labor force, respectively (CCC 2012). Similar economic decline has befallen Bethlehem’s health and education facilities, with rural facilities being disproportionately affected. For instance, in 2007, the economic contribution of education and health care in Bethlehem’s city-area were 6.6 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively, but only 2.6 percent and 5.5 percent for Bethlehem’s city-region (PCBS 2008: 44).

In Bethlehem, as well as across the West Bank, the Wall has established a Kafkaesque reality, posing formidable physical, spatial, bureaucratic, and social challenges. Due to its confiscation of land and natural resources it impedes sustainable spatial development across the Palestinian Territory, which would be crucial for Palestinian state-building efforts. Moreover, the Wall’s ongoing redefinition of the spatiality of Palestine’s urban and rural communities has severed people from their land, producers from consumers, and rural communities from their urban centers. To be sure, while the closures had already severely weakened the Palestinian economy, the Wall has constituted a “shock” to its very sustainability (UN/UNESCO 2005).

See Appendix, Figure 2

Conclusion

Karl Polanyi cited Aristotle to emphasize that humans are not just economic, but also social beings. Concerns for human rights, social equality, and historical lessons that question the wisdom of constructing barriers with a view to establishing long-term peace and international security, however, have been subordinated to the intertwined logic of the political and economic gains – for some – of expanding and securing the control of states over territories and people (Leuenberger 2013; Scott 1998; Sterling 2009). The spatial developments in Palestine, and Israel’s administration and control over population flows through the establishment of various exclusionary mechanisms – including the Wall – have been driven by local politics and economics and have become part and parcel of the logic of a new global security-industrial complex. Not only has the politics of occupation been driven by a neoliberal agenda, but also the very making of the Palestinian state was supposed to be a neoliberal economic miracle. Political agendas of national liberation thus became subsumed by the dream of neoliberal reform as a new form of political state building. Indeed as Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) observe, neoliberalism is no longer merely one model of state/economy relations that national governments may choose to promote within their territories … [but rather] the evolution of any politico-institutional configuration following the imposition of neoliberal policy reforms is likely to demonstrate strong properties of path-dependency, in which established institutional arrangements significantly constrain the scope and trajectory of reform. (Brenner/Theodore 2002: 361)

Neoliberal agendas, although transformed and shaped by particular institutional landscapes and power configurations, achieved dominance in the late twentieth century. National governments and local stakeholders from the Global South have only recently starting to “talk back” to the neoliberal agenda setters. At the same time, the failure of unbridled neoliberal “reforms” has given policy-makers and academics pause concerning how to remake policy programs and develop academic understanding, that take into account local development trajectories without marginalizing local capacities and social, economic, and political needs. Economists are increasingly arguing for “a broader view of development that focuses on the economic, social, political, environmental and cultural aspects of a society” (Owusu 2003: 1661; see also Sen 2009) and that propagates a more human-centric and holistic approach, so as to alleviate some of the pitfalls of rapid globalization, which has produced stark inequalities, hand in hand with swathes of social problems, ranging from poverty and social delinquency to terrorism. As the World Bank’s president has argued, “the world will not be stable if we do not deal with the question of poverty. If it is not stable, we will be affected by migration, crime, drugs and terror” (Wolfensohn, cited in Owusu 2003: 1667).

In the meantime, the World Bank’s (2010) concern is the sustainability of the Palestinian economy under conditions of closures. The World Bank maintains that the most efficient way to improve economic opportunities in Palestine and tackle the pervasive social problems would be to lift movement and access restrictions. Given the renewed stalemate in peace negotiations since 2014, however, economic measures that would circumvent mobility restrictions and increase Palestinian self-sufficiency and reliance are some of the only measures that could improve Palestinian economic life. Because of the fragmentation of the Palestinian economy, new centers of localization with increasingly diverse industries would circumvent the mobility restrictions and boost skill development, thereby facilitating economic activities. In a fragmented market such local resource development can reduce “economic vulnerability” (UN/UNESCO 2005: 45).
Again, the lessons from Palestine are not unlike those learned across the Global South, only in the West Bank and Gaza the conditions are worsened by the troubled geopolitics of the region. Elsewhere, globalization without protectionism has threatened the social, political, and economic sustainability of developing countries (Sen 2009), but “economic neoliberalism” threatens the West Bank and Gaza even more because of its dependency on Israel (economically and in terms of policies) (Samara 2000)) and inescapable territorial fragmentation. The call on Palestinians to localize production and consumption facilities and to develop local resources and skills is particularly pertinent in a fragmented territory over which Palestinians’ sovereignty claims are merely patchy. Then again, the need for local capacity-building so as to sustain local infrastructures, people, and economies is a call that reverberates across developing economies in the Global South. The West Bank and Gaza are particularly pertinent examples of the pitfalls associated with the need to establish a functioning state and a viable political economy in a globalized world at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Endnotes

1 Under international law, the Palestinian Territories are under Israeli occupation. The Israeli government, however, contends that due to Israel’s need to defend itself and its replacement of Jordanian rule over the West Bank, its presence in the West Bank has a unique legal character (Ayoub 2003).

2 The term “intifada” means “shaking”, which for some Israelis implies a Palestinian war against Israel, and to Palestinians signifies a popular uprising against an occupying regime.

3 For up-to-date closure maps of the West Bank and Gaza, see UN OCHA Jerusalem: http://www.ochaopt.org/maps.aspx?id=96.

4 The International Court of Justice (2004) declared that what it referred to as the “Wall” (this term was used as it was considered to be most descriptive of its physical consequences for freedom of movement on the ground) to be illegal under international law. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&case=131&p3=4.

5 For the full 1923 text written by Vladimir Jabotinsky see http://www.jabotinsky.org/multimedia/upl_doc/doc_191207_49117.pdf.

6 It has to be noted that, while the negative consequences of the closures and the Wall become ever more obvious for Palestinians, they at the same time signify the dissolution and softening of boundaries for the Israeli security forces who, under the guise of security, may penetrate into the Palestinian territories at any time, “walking through [the very] walls” (Weizman 2006: 8) that contain the local population (Algazi 2014).


8 The average per capita income in Israel is 32,000 US dollars as against 1,000 US dollars in the Palestinian Territory, indicating the growing imbalance in terms of socio-economic conditions (Karim/Farraj/Tamari 2010: 42).

9 Palestine’s urbanization level is higher than other Arab States (which have an average of 57 percent of their population living in urban centers, against a global average of 51 percent). Israel, on the other hand, has an almost 92 percent urban population (UNDP 2011: 160–165), which arguably has to do with the establishment of Israeli communities on the periphery of the main cities (Alfasi/Fenster 2014).
References


United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2013: The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier. Jerusalem: UNOCHA.


Appendix

Figure 1: UN OCHA West Bank Access Restriction Map, September 2014
Figure 2: Geo-political Classifications of Bethlehem City-region by the Wall, Scale 1:175,000 (ARIJ 2013)